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Responsibility-Shifting through Delegation: Evidence from China’s One-Child Policy

Author

Listed:
  • Yiming Liu

    (HU Berlin)

  • Yi Han

    (Renmin University of China)

Abstract

We provide evidence on how responsibility-shifting through delegation occurred in China’s implementation of the one-child policy. We show that trust in local governments was reduced when they were the primary enforcer of the policy (1979–1990), while trust in neighbors was reduced when civilians were incentivized to report neighbors’ violations of the policy to the authorities (1991–2015). This effect was more pronounced among parents of a firstborn daughter, who were more likely to violate the policy due to the deep-rooted son preference. This study provides the first set of field evidence on the responsibility-shifting effect of delegation.

Suggested Citation

  • Yiming Liu & Yi Han, 2023. "Responsibility-Shifting through Delegation: Evidence from China’s One-Child Policy," Rationality and Competition Discussion Paper Series 400, CRC TRR 190 Rationality and Competition.
    • Handle: RePEc:rco:dpaper:400
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    delegation; responsibility-shifting; One-Child policy;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D02 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Institutions: Design, Formation, Operations, and Impact
    • D04 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Microeconomic Policy: Formulation; Implementation; Evaluation
    • D90 - Microeconomics - - Micro-Based Behavioral Economics - - - General
    • J18 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demographic Economics - - - Public Policy

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