We report on the nature of a utility optimizing transfer from one regional government to another when local public goods are present. Computer examples reveal that small differences in regional endowments result in large differences in equilibrium outcomes for two regions, under optimal transfers. The scale effect (lower tax charge per person for the same public good in more populous regions) leads to the small region generally providing transfers to the larger region.
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Paper provided by Queen's University, Department of Economics in its series Working Papers with number
1221.
References listed on IDEAS Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
Glaeser, Edward L & Mare, David C, 2001.
"Cities and Skills,"
Journal of Labor Economics,
University of Chicago Press, vol. 19(2), pages 316-42, April.
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Other versions:
Glaeser, E.L. & Mare, D.C., 1994.
"Cities and Skills,"
Papers
e-94-11, Stanford - Hoover Institution.
Edward L. Glaeser & David C. Mare, 1994.
"Cities and Skills,"
NBER Working Papers
4728, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)