Risk sharing in a federation with population mobility and long horizons
AbstractIn this paper risk sharing among individuals within and across regions in a federation with population mobility and infinite horizons is considered. It is shown that the regional authorities will not fully exploit gains from interregional risk sharing when population mobility is imperfect. In the Nash equilibrium there is complete risk sharing among the individuals within each region, however, which corresponds to the policies of the central authority. Regional authorities who care about their reputation may be able to commit to an efficient allocation. It is possible that improvements in the degree of mobility will make such commitments likely.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Canadian Economics Association in its journal Canadian Journal of Economics.
Volume (Year): 33 (2000)
Issue (Month): 3 (August)
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Postal: Canadian Economics Association Prof. Steven Ambler, Secretary-Treasurer c/o Olivier Lebert, CEA/CJE/CPP Office C.P. 35006, 1221 Fleury Est Montréal, Québec, Canada H2C 3K4
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Find related papers by JEL classification:
- H77 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - Intergovernmental Relations; Federalism
- E61 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Policy Objectives; Policy Designs and Consistency; Policy Coordination
- F36 - International Economics - - International Finance - - - Financial Aspects of Economic Integration
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- Lohse, Tim & Robledo, Julio R., 2012.
"Public self-insurance and the Samaritan's dilemma in a federation,"
Discussion Papers, Research Professorship & Project "The Future of Fiscal Federalism"
SP II 2012-103, Social Science Research Center Berlin (WZB).
- Tim Lohse & Julio R. Robledo, 2012. "Public Self-Insurance and the Samaritan‘s Dilemma in a Federation," Ruhr Economic Papers 0330, Rheinisch-Westfälisches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung, Ruhr-Universität Bochum, Universität Dortmund, Universität Duisburg-Essen.
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