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Tax Competition and Fiscal Equalization

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Author Info
Marko Köthenbürger ()

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Abstract

This paper analyzes the relation between tax competition and fiscal equalization. In particular, it asks the question whether fiscal equalization schemes can mitigate inefficient tax competition. Two transfer schemes are considered: tax revenue and tax base equalization schemes. The paper shows that equalizing transfers may internalize fiscal externalities. In particular, in a small open economy tax base equalization yields efficient tax rates. Thus, transfer mechanisms with an explicit redistributive character do not always impair efficiency. Copyright Kluwer Academic Publishers 2002

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File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1023/A:1016511918510
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Publisher Info
Article provided by Springer in its journal International Tax and Public Finance.

Volume (Year): 9 (2002)
Issue (Month): 4 (August)
Pages: 391-408
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Handle: RePEc:kap:itaxpf:v:9:y:2002:i:4:p:391-408

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Related research
Keywords: capital tax competition; fiscal equalization; federal system;

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References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Hwang, Hae-shin & Choe, Byeongho, 1995. "Distribution of factor endowments and tax competition," Regional Science and Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 25(5), pages 655-673, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Michael Smart, 1998. "Taxation and Deadweight Loss in a System of Intergovernmental Transfers," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 31(1), pages 189-206, February.
  3. Wilson, John Douglas, 1991. "Tax competition with interregional differences in factor endowments," Regional Science and Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 21(3), pages 423-451, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Bucovetsky, Sam & Wilson, John Douglas, 1991. "Tax competition with two tax instruments," Regional Science and Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 21(3), pages 333-350, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. John F. Helliwell & Ross McKitrick, 1999. "Comparing Capital Mobility Across Provincial and National Borders," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 32(5), pages 1164-1173, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  6. Alejandro Esteller & Albert Solé, 2001. "Tax Setting in a Federal System: The Case of Personal Income Taxation in Canada," Working Papers 2001/9, Institut d'Economia de Barcelona (IEB). [Downloadable!]
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  7. Eckhard Janeba, 2000. "Tax Competition When Governments Lack Commitment: Excess Capacity as a Countervailing Threat," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 90(5), pages 1508-1519, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Wildasin, David E., 1989. "Interjurisdictional capital mobility: Fiscal externality and a corrective subsidy," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 25(2), pages 193-212, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  9. DePeter James A. & Myers Gordon M., 1994. "Strategic Capital Tax Competition: A Pecuniary Externality and a Corrective Device," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 36(1), pages 66-78, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  10. Laussel, Didier & Le Breton, Michel, 1998. "Existence of Nash equilibria in fiscal competition models," Regional Science and Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 28(3), pages 283-296, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  11. Bucovetsky, S., 1991. "Asymmetric tax competition," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 30(2), pages 167-181, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  12. Masayoshi Hayashi & Robin Boadway, 2001. "An empirical analysis of intergovernmental tax interaction: the case of business income taxes in Canada," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 34(2), pages 481-503, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  13. Robin W. Boadway & Frank R. Flatters, 1982. "Efficiency and Equalization Payments in a Federal System of Government: A Synthesis and Extension of Recent Results," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 15(4), pages 613-33, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  14. Bev Dahlby, 1996. "Fiscal externalities and the design of intergovernmental grants," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer, vol. 3(3), pages 397-412, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  15. Cremer, Helmuth & Gahvari, Firouz, 2000. "Tax evasion, fiscal competition and economic integration," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 44(9), pages 1633-1657, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Thiess Büttner & Sebastian Hauptmeier & Robert Schwager, 2006. "Efficient Revenue Sharing and Upper Level Governments: Theory and Application to Germany," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  2. Thiess Buettner & Fédéric Holm-Hadulla, 2008. "Fiscal Equalization: The Case of German Municipalities," CESifo DICE Report, Ifo Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich, vol. 6(1), pages 16-20, 04. [Downloadable!]
  3. HINDRIKS, Jean & PERALTA, Susana & WEBER, Shlomo, 2005. "Fiscal competition, revenue sharing, and policy-induced agglomeration," CORE Discussion Papers 2005093, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE). [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  4. John M. Hartwick, 2009. ""Reverse" Intergovernmental Transfers Between Regions with Local Public Goods," Working Papers 1221, Queen's University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  5. Thiess Büttner, 2005. "The Incentive Effect of Fiscal Equalization Transfers on Tax Policy," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  6. Marko Koethenbuerger, 2007. "Federal Tax-Transfer Policy and Intergovernmental Pre-Commitment," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
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