We examine the impact of abatement taxes on the pollution level in a duopoly framework with endogenous market structure. We demonstrate that an increase in abatement taxes could trigger a regime-switch from Cournot competition to merger, as well as from merger to Cournot competition. The nature of this switch is critically dependent on the nature of merger costs. However, in either case, this may cause the pollution level to increase.
Download Info
To download:
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the
proper application to
view it first. Information about this may be contained
in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read
the IDEAS help
file. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS
site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Publisher Info
Paper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number
7900.
Find related papers by JEL classification: Q5 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics Q56 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics - - - Environment and Development; Environment and Trade; Sustainability; Environmental Accounting O13 - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Agriculture; Natural Resources; Environment; Other Primary Products
References listed on IDEAS Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.: