Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login to save this paper or follow this series

National vs. international welfare effects of horizontal mergers

Contents:

Author Info

  • Hott, Christian

Abstract

Empirical evidence suggests that many mergers do not increase profits of the participating firms and decrease welfare. Due to the globalization of markets we should take an international view on mergers and their welfare effects. This paper develops a Bertrand-model of an international heterogeneous market. It shows that there are neither positive incentives to merge nor positive international welfare effects from a merger if there are no positive synergy effects. Furthermore, it shows that national welfare effects are bigger than international ones when there are many domestic firms relative to domestic demand. --

Download Info

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
File URL: http://econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/48152/1/341380962.pdf
Download Restriction: no

Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Dresden University of Technology, Faculty of Business and Economics, Department of Economics in its series Dresden Discussion Paper Series in Economics with number 10/01.

as in new window
Length:
Date of creation: 2001
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:zbw:tuddps:1001

Contact details of provider:
Postal: 01062 Dresden
Phone: ++49 351 463 2196
Fax: ++49 351 463 7739
Email:
Web page: http://www.tu-dresden.de/wiwi/
More information through EDIRC

Related research

Keywords:

Find related papers by JEL classification:

References

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
as in new window
  1. Hay, George A & Werden, Gregory J, 1993. "Horizontal Mergers: Law, Policy, and Economics," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 83(2), pages 173-77, May.
  2. Raymond Deneckere & Carl Davidson, 1985. "Incentives to Form Coalitions with Bertrand Competition," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 16(4), pages 473-486, Winter.
  3. Braid, Ralph M., 1999. "The price and profit effects of horizontal mergers in two-dimensional spatial competition," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 62(1), pages 113-119, January.
  4. Farrell, Joseph & Shapiro, Carl, 1988. "Horizontal Mergers: An Equilibrium Analysis," Department of Economics, Working Paper Series qt0tp305nx, Department of Economics, Institute for Business and Economic Research, UC Berkeley.
  5. Jacquemin, Alexis, 1990. "Horizontal concentration and European merger policy," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 34(2-3), pages 539-550, May.
  6. Perry, Martin K & Porter, Robert H, 1985. "Oligopoly and the Incentive for Horizontal Merger," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 75(1), pages 219-27, March.
  7. Salant, Stephen W & Switzer, Sheldon & Reynolds, Robert J, 1983. "Losses from Horizontal Merger: The Effects of an Exogenous Change in Industry Structure on Cournot-Nash Equilibrium," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 98(2), pages 185-99, May.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

Citations

Lists

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Corrections

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:zbw:tuddps:1001. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (ZBW - German National Library of Economics).

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.