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Interior Collective Optimum in a Volontary Contribution to a Public-Goods Game : An Experimental Approach

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Hichri, Walid

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Abstract

We run a public good experiment with four different treatments. The payoff function is chosen such that the Nash equilibrium (NE) and the collective optimum (CO) are both in the interior of the strategy space. We try to test the effect of varying the level of the collective optimum, which changes the "social dilemma", involved in the decision as to how much to contribute to the public good . Our results show that contributions increase with the level of the interior CO. There is overcontribution in comparison to the NE and under contribution in comparison to the CO. But contributions are as far from the CO as the level of this former gets high. An overcontribution index that takes into account the effective contribution relative to both, the NE and the CO, shows that subjects adopt a constant behavior while passing from one treatment to another: they contribute a constant share of the CO.

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number 7883.

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Date of creation: 2004
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Publication status: Published in Applied Economics Letters 3.11(2004): pp. 135-140
Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:7883

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Related research
Keywords: Public Goods Experiments Interior Solutions Social Dilemma.

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
C92 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Group Behavior
H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods
C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games

References listed on IDEAS
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  1. Claudia Keser & Roy Gardner, 1999. "Strategic behavior of experienced subjects in a common pool resource game," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 28(2), pages 241-252. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  2. Chan, Kenneth S. & Godby, Rob & Mestelman, Stuart & Muller, R. Andrew, 1997. "Equity theory and the voluntary provision of public goods," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 32(3), pages 349-364, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Sefton, Martin & Steinberg, Richard, 1996. "Reward structures in public good experiments," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 61(2), pages 263-287, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Anderson, Simon P. & Goeree, Jacob K. & Holt, Charles A., 1998. "A theoretical analysis of altruism and decision error in public goods games," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 70(2), pages 297-323, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Marc WILLINGER & Anthony ZIEGELMEYER, 1999. "Framing and cooperation in public good games: an experiment with an interior solution," Working Papers of BETA 9901, Bureau d'Economie Théorique et Appliquée, ULP, Strasbourg. [Downloadable!]
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  6. R. Isaac & James Walker, 1998. "Nash as an Organizing Principle in the Voluntary Provision of Public Goods: Experimental Evidence," Experimental Economics, Springer, vol. 1(3), pages 191-206, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Keser, Claudia, 1996. "Voluntary contributions to a public good when partial contribution is a dominant strategy," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 50(3), pages 359-366, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. van Dijk, Frans & van Winden, Frans, 1997. "Dynamics of social ties and local public good provision," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 64(3), pages 323-341, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  9. Marc Willinger & Anthony Ziegelmeyer, 2001. "Strength of the Social Dilemma in a Public Goods Experiment: An Exploration of the Error Hypothesis," Experimental Economics, Springer, vol. 4(2), pages 131-144, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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