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E commerce as a tool for resource expansion: postal partnerships, data protection legislation and the mitigation of implementation gaps

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  • Ojo, Marianne

Abstract

This chapter is aimed at illustrating how the potential of E commerce as a tool for resource expansion, can be maximized where information gaps, asymmetries, and more specifically, implementation gaps are addressed and mitigated. Engaging stakeholders, as well as bright line rules - distinguished from principles, at relevant phases and stages of mediation process between agents and stakeholders, would not only serve to foster greater accountability, but also ensure that better enforcement mechanisms are in place. Hence chapter illustrates how the stakeholder theory can be considered to be consistent with value maximization. Whilst incomplete contracts provide benefits of flexibility, they have also been criticized for facilitating lack of clarity in respect of objectives, focus and accountability in the decision making process. Furthermore, through the engagement of stakeholders, as well as appropriate forms of regulation, the chapter will also, simultaneously, illustrate how a “properly constructed Balanced Scorecard” can comprehensively communicate enterprises' business strategies.

Suggested Citation

  • Ojo, Marianne, 2016. "E commerce as a tool for resource expansion: postal partnerships, data protection legislation and the mitigation of implementation gaps," MPRA Paper 70175, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  • Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:70175
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    expectation gap; Balanced Scorecard; implementation gap; corporate governance; audits;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • E3 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Prices, Business Fluctuations, and Cycles
    • G2 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services
    • G3 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance
    • G38 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Government Policy and Regulation
    • K2 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law
    • M4 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Accounting

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