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Small World of Inter-firm Network an Firm's Acquisition Behaviour - An Evidence from India

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  • Biswas, Shreya

Abstract

Using a sample of listed firms in India, the study finds that the inter-firm network on account of director interlocks is a small world and the network has become more integrated since the introduction of corporate governance regulations in the country. Firm level analysis finds a negative relation between average path length and probability of acquiring indicating the importance of faster reach of information among the firms within the network. It also finds a non-linear relation given by inverted U-shaped curve between firm level clustering and probability of acquiring. Initially, increase in clustering has a positive effect through the informational quality effect; however at higher levels the negative informational redundancy effect dominates leading to a curvilinear relation.

Suggested Citation

  • Biswas, Shreya, 2015. "Small World of Inter-firm Network an Firm's Acquisition Behaviour - An Evidence from India," MPRA Paper 67508, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  • Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:67508
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
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    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Corporate Governance; Small-world; Director Interlocks; Inter-firm Network; Acquisitions;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • G32 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill
    • G34 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Corporate Governance
    • L25 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Firm Performance

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