IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/pra/mprapa/64591.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Mathématique et Démocratie : une contribution de la Théorie du Choix Social à la pratique de la démocratie en RDC
[Mathematics and Democracy: a Social Choice Theory contribution to practicing democracy in DRC]

Author

Listed:
  • Ngoie, Ruffin-Benoît M.
  • Mbaka, Ruffin M.

Abstract

The purpose of this paper is to have in a simple and detailed way the significant results in theory of social choice and to study the resource sharing (goods or responsibilities) between petitioning agents in a proof of election. While analyzing social choice functions more in sight, we present for each of them, with supporting examples, the difficulties and insufficiencies related to the aggregation of the individual preferences of each member of the community. We have then some theoretical results allowing the understanding of the nature and the magnitude of these difficulties. In addition, we study the situation of African societies in general, and that of the Democratic Republic of Congo in particular, and sort out the social choice function which is the most appropriate to them. Meanwhile, we take into account the fair distribution of goods and work for the common benefit of society members, which is the guarantee of welfare of individuals, stability and social peace. These are social values seldom found in Africa. We finally study the properties of the recommended social choice function and possibly present its strength and weaknesses, its advantages and disadvantages when used as a mode of poll.

Suggested Citation

  • Ngoie, Ruffin-Benoît M. & Mbaka, Ruffin M., 2014. "Mathématique et Démocratie : une contribution de la Théorie du Choix Social à la pratique de la démocratie en RDC [Mathematics and Democracy: a Social Choice Theory contribution to practicing democ," MPRA Paper 64591, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised Jun 2014.
    • Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:64591
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/64591/1/MPRA_paper_64591.pdf
    File Function: original version
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Sugden, Robert, 1985. "Liberty, Preference, and Choice," Economics and Philosophy, Cambridge University Press, vol. 1(2), pages 213-229, October.
    2. Amartya Sen, 1999. "La possibilité du choix social [Conférence Nobel]," Revue de l'OFCE, Programme National Persée, vol. 70(1), pages 7-61.
    3. Sen, Amartya Kumar, 1970. "The Impossibility of a Paretian Liberal," Scholarly Articles 3612779, Harvard University Department of Economics.
    4. Sen, Amartya, 1970. "The Impossibility of a Paretian Liberal," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 78(1), pages 152-157, Jan.-Feb..
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Ngoie, Ruffin-Benoit M., 2012. "Choix social et partage équitable : Une analyse mathématique a posteriori des élections législatives et présidentielles de 2006 et 2011 en RDC [Social choice and fair sharing: An a posteriori mathe," MPRA Paper 64915, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    2. Leo Katz & Alvaro Sandroni, 2020. "Limits on power and rationality," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 54(2), pages 507-521, March.
    3. Ngo Long & Vincent Martinet, 2018. "Combining rights and welfarism: a new approach to intertemporal evaluation of social alternatives," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 50(1), pages 35-64, January.
    4. Ben McQuillin & Robert Sugden, 2011. "The representation of alienable and inalienable rights: games in transition function form," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 37(4), pages 683-706, October.
    5. Mathias Risse, 2001. "What to Make of the Liberal Paradox?," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 50(2), pages 169-196, March.
    6. repec:hal:journl:dumas-00906152 is not listed on IDEAS
    7. Kretz, Claudio, 2021. "Consistent rights on property spaces," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 197(C).
    8. Guilhem Lecouteux & Ivan Mitrouchev, 2022. "Preference Purification in Behavioural Welfare Economics: an Impossibility Result," GREDEG Working Papers 2022-31, Groupe de REcherche en Droit, Economie, Gestion (GREDEG CNRS), Université Côte d'Azur, France.
    9. Herrade Igersheim, 2006. "Libéralisme de la liberté versus libéralisme du bonheur. Le cas du paradoxe libéral-parétien," Revue économique, Presses de Sciences-Po, vol. 57(3), pages 389-398.
    10. Berrens, Robert P. & Polasky, Stephen, 1995. "The Paretian Liberal Paradox and ecological economics," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 14(1), pages 45-56, July.
    11. Kotaro Suzumura, 2002. "Introduction to social choice and welfare," Temi di discussione (Economic working papers) 442, Bank of Italy, Economic Research and International Relations Area.
    12. Peleg, Bezalel & Peters, Hans & Storcken, Ton, 2002. "Nash consistent representation of constitutions: a reaction to the Gibbard paradox," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 43(2), pages 267-287, March.
    13. Guilhem Lecouteux & Ivan Mitrouchev, 2021. "The "View from Manywhere": Normative Economics with Context-Dependent Preferences," GREDEG Working Papers 2021-19, Groupe de REcherche en Droit, Economie, Gestion (GREDEG CNRS), Université Côte d'Azur, France.
    14. Piggins, Ashley & Salerno, Gillian, 2016. "Sen cycles and externalities," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 149(C), pages 25-27.
    15. Ngoie, Ruffin-Benoît M. & Ulungu, Berthold E.-L., 2013. "Choix social et préférence collective : analyse a posteriori de l’élection présidentielle de 2011 en République Démocratique du Congo [Social choice and collective value: A posteriori analysis of 2," MPRA Paper 64538, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 08 Jan 2015.
    16. Herrade Igersheim, 2013. "Invoking a Cartesian product structure on social states," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 74(4), pages 463-477, April.
    17. Massimiliano Vatiero, 2023. "Extending Amartya Sen’s Paretian Liberal Paradox to a Firm’s Hierarchy," DEM Working Papers 2023/3, Department of Economics and Management.
    18. Prasanta K. Pattanaik & Yongsheng Xu, 2020. "Institutions and their ethical evaluation," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 54(2), pages 293-310, March.
    19. Robert Sugden, 2021. "Normative economics without preferences," International Review of Economics, Springer;Happiness Economics and Interpersonal Relations (HEIRS), vol. 68(1), pages 5-19, March.
    20. Antoinette Baujard, 2016. "Utilitarianism and anti-utilitarianism," Chapters, in: Gilbert Faccarello & Heinz D. Kurz (ed.), Handbook on the History of Economic Analysis Volume III, chapter 40, pages 576-588, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    21. Bernholz, Peter, 1997. "Property rights, contracts, cyclical social preferences and the Coase theorem: A synthesis," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 13(3), pages 419-442, September.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Aggregation; Elections; Shares; Social choice theory; Social choice function.;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C70 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - General
    • C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
    • D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • D74 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances; Revolutions

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:64591. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Joachim Winter (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/vfmunde.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.