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Choix social et préférence collective : analyse a posteriori de l’élection présidentielle de 2011 en République Démocratique du Congo
[Social choice and collective value: A posteriori analysis of 2011 presidential election in Democratic Republic of the Congo]

Author

Listed:
  • Ngoie, Ruffin-Benoît M.
  • Ulungu, Berthold E.-L.

Abstract

The official results analysis of the Congolese presidential elections in 2011 aims at studying behavior displayed by voters towards the selected mode of poll. This reveals that most of them carry out a strategic vote because feeling, in an intuitive way, weaknesses of a single member voting system. This paper characterizes congolese voters’ behavior by province and reveals, in addition, that there would be a mechanism making it possible to pass from a preferences profile to another which would facilitate inductions. New concepts were brought there, in particular the preferences transformation function (PTF) and the Pseudo-Condorcet Winner of (PCW).

Suggested Citation

  • Ngoie, Ruffin-Benoît M. & Ulungu, Berthold E.-L., 2013. "Choix social et préférence collective : analyse a posteriori de l’élection présidentielle de 2011 en République Démocratique du Congo [Social choice and collective value: A posteriori analysis of 2," MPRA Paper 64538, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 08 Jan 2015.
    • Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:64538
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    File URL: https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/64538/1/MPRA_paper_64538.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Ngoie, Ruffin-Benoit M., 2012. "Choix social et partage équitable : Une analyse mathématique a posteriori des élections législatives et présidentielles de 2006 et 2011 en RDC [Social choice and fair sharing: An a posteriori mathe," MPRA Paper 64915, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    2. Amartya Sen, 1999. "La possibilité du choix social [Conférence Nobel]," Revue de l'OFCE, Programme National Persée, vol. 70(1), pages 7-61.
    3. Gibbard, Allan, 1974. "A Pareto-consistent libertarian claim," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 7(4), pages 388-410, April.
    4. Sen, Amartya Kumar, 1970. "The Impossibility of a Paretian Liberal," Scholarly Articles 3612779, Harvard University Department of Economics.
    5. Sen, Amartya, 1970. "The Impossibility of a Paretian Liberal," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 78(1), pages 152-157, Jan.-Feb..
    6. Antoinette Baujard & Herrade Igersheim, 2009. "Expérimentation du vote par note et du vote par approbation le 22 avril 2007. Premiers résultats," Revue économique, Presses de Sciences-Po, vol. 60(1), pages 189-201.
    7. Kenneth J. Arrow, 1950. "A Difficulty in the Concept of Social Welfare," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 58(4), pages 328-328.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Elections; Game of vote; Mode of poll; several-member voting system; single-member voting system; Strategic vote;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
    • D70 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - General
    • D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • I31 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Welfare, Well-Being, and Poverty - - - General Welfare, Well-Being

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