Money, Credit, Capital and the State: On the evolution of money and institutions
AbstractThis paper combines several important arguments, which have puzzled economic theory for decades, to arrive at a more adequate description of the current global crisis. The main theoretical innovation is to view the long-run economic evolution as a stepwise evolution of money forms. Moreover, as already indicated in the title, this development of money forms is closely linked to the development of social institutions, in particular of state institutions. Capital, the most recent form of money, today has to be understood as an omnipresent algorithm, as a growth imperative implicit in social institutions and internalized models. The task of evolutionary political economy thus will be to provide an adequate theoretical counterpart to mirror these processes. This paper explores how far a careful reconsideration of received economic theory can contribute to this task.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number 47166.
Date of creation: 11 Feb 2013
Date of revision:
Money; Credit; Capital; State;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- B50 - Schools of Economic Thought and Methodology - - Current Heterodox Approaches - - - General
- E02 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - General - - - Institutions and the Macroeconomy
- P16 - Economic Systems - - Capitalist Systems - - - Political Economy of Capitalism
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2013-06-04 (All new papers)
- NEP-HIS-2013-06-04 (Business, Economic & Financial History)
- NEP-HME-2013-06-04 (Heterodox Microeconomics)
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