We examine fiscal policy coordination in a two-country world with two types of asymmetries. The first type of asymmetry is a difference in the efficiency of taxation systems, the second is a varying degree of myopia as represented by discount rates. We examine the conditions under which cooperation is beneficial for both countries and we examine how asymmetries affect the loss inflicted by discretion. Our results show that if asymmetries are too great, EMU has poor welfare properties.
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Paper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number
4472.
Find related papers by JEL classification: F33 - International Economics - - International Finance - - - International Monetary Arrangements and Institutions E42 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Money and Interest Rates - - - Monetary Sytsems; Standards; Regimes; Government and the Monetary System
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