Crise systémique et régulation financière
[Systemic crisis and financial regulation]
AbstractOne of the privileged explanations of the current crisis is the sophistication and the weak transparency of financial markets which would have allowed speculative behavior to elude authorities’ supervision. This article develops a different view by putting the emphasis on the model of organization of financial systems. This is established on the predominance of micro-prudential supervision schemes following the hypothesis of free market efficiency. From 1980-90, prudential mechanisms have worked in favor of self-regulation models and the systemic stability is mainly founded on the individual security of banking institutions. We show that this orientation suffers from the fallacy of composition; the micro-prudential model turns out to be unsuitable for the management of systemic risks because of the absence of an automatic bridge between the micro and the macroeconomic levels. The new regulatory environment feeds then successive bubbles the recurrence of which seems to require a modification of the rules of organization to avoid the forced socialization of the losses of private actors.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number 35466.
Date of creation: 20 Dec 2010
Date of revision:
Systemic crisis; efficient markets; regulatory schemes;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- G18 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Government Policy and Regulation
- E44 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Money and Interest Rates - - - Financial Markets and the Macroeconomy
- G01 - Financial Economics - - General - - - Financial Crises
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- Barth,James R. & Caprio,Gerard & Levine,Ross, 2006.
"Rethinking Bank Regulation,"
Cambridge University Press, number 9780521855761.
- Daniel K. Tarullo, 2009. "Financial regulation: past and future: a speech at the Money Marketeers of New York University, New York, New York, November 9, 2009," Web Site, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
- Garry J. Schinasi, 2004. "Defining Financial Stability," IMF Working Papers 04/187, International Monetary Fund.
- Roberto Frenkel & Martin Rapetti, 2009. "A developing country view of the current global crisis: what should not be forgotten and what should be done," Cambridge Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 33(4), pages 685-702, July.
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