IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/pra/mprapa/32215.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Default risk and fiscal sustainability in PIIGS countries

Author

Listed:
  • Canale, Rosaria Rita

Abstract

European Monetary Union experiences the division into two major blocks according to their ability to respect fiscal criteria and replace their bonds on the market. The so-called PIIGS countries are asked to hardly reduce their deficit and debt in order to prevent speculative attacks and preserve the Currency Union. The aim of the paper is to show that speculative attacks on government debt are not directly linked to default probability, but to liquidity requirements and to the EU fiscal constraints. In times of crisis the path of deficit/GDP ratio goes up and send the signal that governments are loosening their fiscal stance. As far as there are liquidity constraints, markets increase the spreads and force governments to fiscal retrenchments, hardly increasing the cost of adjustment. The result is that in the absence of a bailout shared mechanism financial markets give policy prescriptions and exert a political pressure without having fiscal sovereignty.

Suggested Citation

  • Canale, Rosaria Rita, 2011. "Default risk and fiscal sustainability in PIIGS countries," MPRA Paper 32215, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    • Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:32215
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/32215/1/MPRA_paper_32215.pdf
    File Function: original version
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Antonio Spilimbergo & Steve Symansky & Olivier Blanchard & Carlo Cottarelli, 2009. "Fiscal Policy For The Crisis," CESifo Forum, ifo Institute - Leibniz Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich, vol. 10(02), pages 26-32, July.
    2. Barro, Robert J, 1974. "Are Government Bonds Net Wealth?," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 82(6), pages 1095-1117, Nov.-Dec..
    3. Kerstin Bernoth & Guntram B. Wolff, 2008. "Fool The Markets? Creative Accounting, Fiscal Transparency And Sovereign Risk Premia," Scottish Journal of Political Economy, Scottish Economic Society, vol. 55(4), pages 465-487, September.
    4. Stéphanie Guichard & David Haugh & David Turner, 2009. "Quantifying the Effect of Financial Conditions in the Euro Area, Japan, United Kingdom and United States," OECD Economics Department Working Papers 677, OECD Publishing.
    5. Paul De Grauwe, 2014. "The Governance of a Fragile Eurozone," World Scientific Book Chapters, in: Exchange Rates and Global Financial Policies, chapter 12, pages 297-320, World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
    6. Obstfeld, Maurice, 1986. "Rational and Self-fulfilling Balance-of-Payments Crises," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 76(1), pages 72-81, March.
    7. Philip Arestis & Malcolm Sawyer, 2003. "Macroeconomic Policies of the Economic Monetary Union: Theoretical Underpinnings and Challenges," Economics Working Paper Archive wp_385, Levy Economics Institute.
    8. Arestis, Philip & McCauley, Kevin & Sawyer, Malcolm, 2001. "An Alternative Stability Pact for the European Union," Cambridge Journal of Economics, Cambridge Political Economy Society, vol. 25(1), pages 113-130, January.
    9. Philip Arestis & Malcolm Sawyer, 2004. "Macroeconomic policies of the Economic and Monetary Union: theoretical underpinnings and challenges," Chapters, in: Philip Arestis & Malcolm Sawyer (ed.), Neo-Liberal Economic Policy, chapter 7, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    10. Jeanne, Olivier, 1998. "Generating real persistent effects of monetary shocks: How much nominal rigidity do we really need?," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 42(6), pages 1009-1032, June.
    11. Kopf, Christian, 2011. "Restoring financial stability in the euro area," CEPS Papers 4292, Centre for European Policy Studies.
    12. Louis-Philippe Rochon & Sergio Rossi, 2007. "Central Banking and Post-Keynesian Economics," Review of Political Economy, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 19(4), pages 539-554.
    13. Ms. Edda Zoli & Ms. Silvia Sgherri, 2009. "Euro Area Sovereign Risk During the Crisis," IMF Working Papers 2009/222, International Monetary Fund.
    14. Dimitri B. Papadimitriou & Greg Hannsgen, 2009. "Recent Rise in Federal Government and Federal Reserve Liabilities--Antidote to a Speculative Hangover," Economics Strategic Analysis Archive sa_apr_09_2, Levy Economics Institute.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Zacharias Bragoudakis & Evangelia Kasimati & Christos Pierros & Nikolaos Rodousakis & George Soklis, 2022. "Measuring Productivities for the 38 OECD Member Countries: An Input-Output Modelling Approach," Mathematics, MDPI, vol. 10(13), pages 1-21, July.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Canale, Rosaria Rita & Napolitano, Oreste, 2009. "The recessive attitude of EMU policies: reflections on the italian experience, 1998–2008," MPRA Paper 20207, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    2. Philip Arestis & Malcolm Sawyer, 2019. "European integration and the ‘euro project’," Chapters, in: Jonathan Michie (ed.), The Handbook of Globalisation, Third Edition, chapter 15, pages 262-271, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    3. De Grauwe, Paul & Ji, Yuemei, 2013. "Self-fulfilling crises in the Eurozone: An empirical test," Journal of International Money and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 34(C), pages 15-36.
    4. Paniagua, Jordi & Sapena, Juan & Tamarit, Cecilio, 2017. "Sovereign debt spreads in EMU: The time-varying role of fundamentals and market distrust," Journal of Financial Stability, Elsevier, vol. 33(C), pages 187-206.
    5. van Riet, Ad, 2010. "Euro area fiscal policies and the crisis," Occasional Paper Series 109, European Central Bank.
    6. Gunther Tichy, 2012. "Zum Versagen der Marktdisziplinierung in der Finanzkrise," Perspektiven der Wirtschaftspolitik, Verein für Socialpolitik, vol. 13, pages 58-80, May.
    7. Gros, Daniel, 2014. "The EMS Crisis of the 1990s: Parallels with the present crisis?," CEPS Papers 9119, Centre for European Policy Studies.
    8. Gros, Daniel, 2012. "A simple model of multiple equilibria and sovereign default," CEPS Papers 7174, Centre for European Policy Studies.
    9. Steininger, Lea & Hesse, Casimir, 2024. "Buying into new ideas: The ECB’s evolving justification of unlimited liquidity," Department of Economics Working Paper Series 357, WU Vienna University of Economics and Business.
    10. Brittle, Shane, 2009. "Ricardian Equivalence and the Efficacy of Fiscal Policy in Australia," Economics Working Papers wp09-10, School of Economics, University of Wollongong, NSW, Australia.
    11. Arghyrou, Michael G. & Kontonikas, Alexandros, 2012. "The EMU sovereign-debt crisis: Fundamentals, expectations and contagion," Journal of International Financial Markets, Institutions and Money, Elsevier, vol. 22(4), pages 658-677.
    12. Giovanni Dosi & Marcello Minenna & Andrea Roventini & Roberto Violi, 2021. "Making the Eurozone work: a risk-sharing reform of the European Stability Mechanism," Annals of Operations Research, Springer, vol. 299(1), pages 617-657, April.
    13. Bernoth, Kerstin & Erdogan, Burcu, 2012. "Sovereign bond yield spreads: A time-varying coefficient approach," Journal of International Money and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 31(3), pages 639-656.
    14. Engelbert Stockhammer & Dimitris P. Sotiropoulos, 2014. "Rebalancing the Euro Area: The Costs of Internal Devaluation," Review of Political Economy, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 26(2), pages 210-233, April.
    15. Schmid, Kai Daniel & Schmidt, Michael, 2012. "EMU, the changing role of public debt and the revival of sovereign credit risk perception," University of Tübingen Working Papers in Business and Economics 48, University of Tuebingen, Faculty of Economics and Social Sciences, School of Business and Economics.
    16. Della Posta, Pompeo, 2016. "Currency and external debt crises: A unifying framework," Journal of Policy Modeling, Elsevier, vol. 38(4), pages 723-736.
    17. Lea Steininger & Casimir Hesse, 2024. "Buying into new ideas: The ECB’s evolving justification of unlimited liquidity," Department of Economics Working Papers wuwp357, Vienna University of Economics and Business, Department of Economics.
    18. Saungweme, Talknice & Odhiambo, Nicholas M., 2020. "The Impact of Domestic and Foreign Public Debt on Economic Growth: Empirical Evidence from Zimbabwe," Economia Internazionale / International Economics, Camera di Commercio Industria Artigianato Agricoltura di Genova, vol. 73(1), pages 77-106.
    19. Giuliana Passamani & Roberto Tamborini & Matteo Tomaselli, 2014. "Sustainability vs. credibility of fiscal consolidation. A Principal Components test for the Euro Zone," DEM Discussion Papers 2014/09, Department of Economics and Management.
    20. Mariam Camarero & Josep Lluís Carrion‐i‐Silvestre & Cecilio Tamarit, 2021. "External imbalances from a GVAR perspective," The World Economy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 44(11), pages 3202-3245, November.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Fiscal policy; sovereign debt crisis; EMU;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • E65 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Studies of Particular Policy Episodes
    • E61 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Policy Objectives; Policy Designs and Consistency; Policy Coordination
    • F33 - International Economics - - International Finance - - - International Monetary Arrangements and Institutions

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:32215. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Joachim Winter (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/vfmunde.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.