Default risk and fiscal sustainability in PIIGS countries
AbstractEuropean Monetary Union experiences the division into two major blocks according to their ability to respect fiscal criteria and replace their bonds on the market. The so-called PIIGS countries are asked to hardly reduce their deficit and debt in order to prevent speculative attacks and preserve the Currency Union. The aim of the paper is to show that speculative attacks on government debt are not directly linked to default probability, but to liquidity requirements and to the EU fiscal constraints. In times of crisis the path of deficit/GDP ratio goes up and send the signal that governments are loosening their fiscal stance. As far as there are liquidity constraints, markets increase the spreads and force governments to fiscal retrenchments, hardly increasing the cost of adjustment. The result is that in the absence of a bailout shared mechanism financial markets give policy prescriptions and exert a political pressure without having fiscal sovereignty.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number 32215.
Date of creation: Jun 2011
Date of revision:
Fiscal policy; sovereign debt crisis; EMU;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- E65 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Studies of Particular Policy Episodes
- E61 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Policy Objectives; Policy Designs and Consistency; Policy Coordination
- F33 - International Economics - - International Finance - - - International Monetary Arrangements and Institutions
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2011-07-21 (All new papers)
- NEP-EEC-2011-07-21 (European Economics)
- NEP-MAC-2011-07-21 (Macroeconomics)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Olivier Jeanne, 1997.
"Generating Real Persistent Effects of Monetary Shocks: How Much Nominal Rigidity Do We Really Need?,"
NBER Working Papers
6258, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Jeanne, Olivier, 1998. "Generating real persistent effects of monetary shocks: How much nominal rigidity do we really need?," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 42(6), pages 1009-1032, June.
- Stéphanie Guichard & David Haugh & David Turner, 2009. "Quantifying the Effect of Financial Conditions in the Euro Area, Japan, United Kingdom and United States," OECD Economics Department Working Papers 677, OECD Publishing.
- Philip Arestis & Kevin McCauley & Malcolm Sawyer, 2000.
"An Alternative Stability Pact for the European Union,"
Economics Working Paper Archive
wp_296, Levy Economics Institute, The.
- Arestis, Philip & McCauley, Kevin & Sawyer, Malcolm, 2001. "An Alternative Stability Pact for the European Union," Cambridge Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 25(1), pages 113-30, January.
- Philip Arestis & Kevin McCauley & Malcolm Sawyer, 2000. "An Alternative Stability Pact for the European Union," Macroeconomics 0004043, EconWPA.
- Maurice Obstfeld, 1986.
"Rational and Self-Fulfilling Balance-of-Payments Crises,"
NBER Working Papers
1486, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Obstfeld, Maurice, 1986. "Rational and Self-fulfilling Balance-of-Payments Crises," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 76(1), pages 72-81, March.
- Kopf, Christian, 2011. "Restoring financial stability in the euro area," CEPS Papers 4292, Centre for European Policy Studies.
- Barro, Robert J, 1974.
"Are Government Bonds Net Wealth?,"
Journal of Political Economy,
University of Chicago Press, vol. 82(6), pages 1095-1117, Nov.-Dec..
- Philip Arestis & Malcolm Sawyer, 2003. "Macroeconomic Policies of the Economic Monetary Union: Theoretical Underpinnings and Challenges," Economics Working Paper Archive wp_385, Levy Economics Institute, The.
- Edda Zoli & Silvia Sgherri, 2009. "Euro Area Sovereign Risk During the Crisis," IMF Working Papers 09/222, International Monetary Fund.
- Kerstin Bernoth & Guntram Wolff, 2006.
"Fool the markets? Creative accounting, fiscal transparency and sovereign risk premia,"
DNB Working Papers
103, Netherlands Central Bank, Research Department.
- Kerstin Bernoth & Guntram B. Wolff, 2008. "Fool The Markets? Creative Accounting, Fiscal Transparency And Sovereign Risk Premia," Scottish Journal of Political Economy, Scottish Economic Society, vol. 55(4), pages 465-487, 09.
- Bernoth, Kerstin & Wolff, Guntram B., 2006. "Fool the markets? Creative accounting, fiscal transparency and sovereign risk premia," Discussion Paper Series 1: Economic Studies 2006,19, Deutsche Bundesbank, Research Centre.
- Kerstin Bernoth & Guntram B. Wolff, 2006. "Fool the Markets? Creative Accounting, Fiscal Transparency and Sovereign Risk Premia," CESifo Working Paper Series 1732, CESifo Group Munich.
- Dimitri B. Papadimitriou & Greg Hannsgen, 2009. "Recent Rise in Federal Government and Federal Reserve Liabilities--Antidote to a Speculative Hangover," Economics Strategic Analysis Archive sa_apr_09_2, Levy Economics Institute, The.
- Louis-Philippe Rochon & Sergio Rossi, 2007. "Central Banking and Post-Keynesian Economics," Review of Political Economy, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 19(4), pages 539-554.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Ekkehart Schlicht).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.