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Retail Payment Systems: What can we Learn from Two-Sided Markets?

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Author Info
Verdier, Marianne
Abstract

Some retail payment systems can be modelled as two-sided markets, where a payment system facilitates money exchanges between consumers on one side and merchants on the other. The system sets rules and standards, to ensure usage and acceptance of its payment instruments by consumers and merchants respectively. Some retail payment systems exhibit indirect network externalities, which is one of the main criteria used to define two-sided markets. As more consumers use the payment platform, more merchants are encouraged to join it. Conversely, the value of holding payment instruments increases with the number of merchants accepting them. The theory of two-sided markets contributes to a better understanding of these retail payment systems, by showing that an asymmetric allocation of costs is needed to maximise the volume of transactions. It also starts to offer results that could explain competition between payment platforms. However, this theory entails some limits to a thorough understanding of retail payment systems. Firstly, we show that some retail payment systems, such as credit transfer or direct debit systems, do not necessarily fulfil all the theoretical criteria used to define twosided markets. Moreover, this theory does not take into account specific features of the payment industry, such as risk management or fraud prevention. This leads us to propose new research directions.

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Paper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number 2606.

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Date of creation: Mar 2006
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Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:2606

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Related research
Keywords: payment systems two-sided markets platform competition payment cards.

Find related papers by JEL classification:
O30 - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth - - Technological Change - - - General
L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection

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  1. Mark Armstrong & Julian Wright, 2007. "Two-sided Markets, Competitive Bottlenecks and Exclusive Contracts," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 32(2), pages 353-380, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Joshua Gans & Stephen King, 2003. "The Neutrality of Interchange Fees in Payment Systems," Topics in Economic Analysis & Policy, Berkeley Electronic Press, vol. 3(1), pages 1069-1069. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Kaiser, Ulrich & Wright, Julian, 2006. "Price structure in two-sided markets: Evidence from the magazine industry," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 24(1), pages 1-28, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  4. Stuart E. Weiner & Julian Wright, 2005. "Interchange fees in various countries: developments and determinants," Payments System Research Working Paper PSR WP 05-01, Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  5. Fabio M. Manenti & Ernesto Somma, 2002. "Plastic Clashes: Competition among Closed and Open Systems in the Credit Card Industry," Industrial Organization 0211012, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
  6. Sujit Chakravorti, 2003. "Theory of Credit Card Networks: A Survey of the Literature," Review of Network Economics, Concept Economics, vol. 2(2), pages 50-68, June. [Downloadable!]
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  7. Schiff, Aaron, 2003. "Open and closed systems of two-sided networks," Information Economics and Policy, Elsevier, vol. 15(4), pages 425-442, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. David S. Evans, 2003. "Some Empirical Aspects of Multi-Sided Platform Industries," Review of Network Economics, Concept Economics, vol. 2(3), pages 191-209, September. [Downloadable!]
  9. Sujit Chakravorti & Roberto Roson, 2006. "Platform Competition in Two-Sided Markets: The Case of Payment Networks," Review of Network Economics, Concept Economics, vol. 5(1), pages 118-143, March. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  10. Schmalensee, Richard, 2002. "Payment Systems and Interchange Fees," Journal of Industrial Economics, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 50(2), pages 103-22, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  11. Jean-Charles Rochet, 2003. "The Theory of Interchange Fees: A Synthesis of Recent Contributions," Review of Network Economics, Concept Economics, vol. 2(2), pages 97-124, June. [Downloadable!]
  12. Robert M. Hunt, 2003. "An Introduction to the Economics of Payment Card Networks," Review of Network Economics, Concept Economics, vol. 2(2), pages 80-96, June. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  13. Jean-Charles Rochet & Jean Tirole, 2002. "Cooperation Among Competitors: Some Economics Of Payment Card Associations," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 33(4), pages 549-570, Winter.
  14. Marc Rysman, 2006. "An Empirical Analysis of Payment Card Usage," Boston University - Department of Economics - Working Papers Series WP2006-002, Boston University - Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  15. Graeme Guthrie & Julian Wright, 2003. "Competing Payment Schemes," Departmental Working Papers wp0311, National University of Singapore, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  16. Mark Armstrong, 2005. "Competition in Two-Sided Markets," Industrial Organization 0505009, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  17. Baxter, William F, 1983. "Bank Interchange of Transactional Paper: Legal and Economic Perspectives," Journal of Law & Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 26(3), pages 541-88, October.
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Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. VAN HOVE, Leo, 2007. "Central Banks and Payment Instruments: a Serious Case of Schizophrenia," MPRA Paper 5281, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]
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