Bergman, Mats A. () (Department of Economics, Södertörn University College)
Abstract
Two-sided network effects in card payment systems are analysed under different market structures, e.g., competition, one-sided monopoly, bilateral monopoly and duopoly; with and without an interchange fee; for the so-called Baxter’s case of non-strategic merchants. A partial ranking of market structures according to their welfare effects is provided. Some support is found for the policy adopted by the EU Commission in the competition law case concerning Visa’s interchange fees.
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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Sveriges Riksbank (Central Bank of Sweden) in its series Working Paper Series with number
185.
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