A Welfare Ranking of Two-Sided Market Regimes
AbstractTwo-sided network effects in card payment systems are analysed under different market structures, e.g., competition, one-sided monopoly, bilateral monopoly and duopoly; with and without an interchange fee; for the so-called Baxter’s case of non-strategic merchants. A partial ranking of market structures according to their welfare effects is provided. Some support is found for the policy adopted by the EU Commission in the competition law case concerning Visa’s interchange fees.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Sveriges Riksbank (Central Bank of Sweden) in its series Working Paper Series with number 185.
Length: 30 pages
Date of creation: 01 Jun 2005
Date of revision: 01 Sep 2005
Two-sided markets; card payments; payment systems; acquiring; issuing; market structure;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
- L11 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Production, Pricing, and Market Structure; Size Distribution of Firms
- L44 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Antitrust Policy and Public Enterprise, Nonprofit Institutions, and Professional Organizations
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2005-07-03 (All new papers)
- NEP-COM-2005-07-03 (Industrial Competition)
- NEP-FIN-2005-07-03 (Finance)
- NEP-NET-2005-07-03 (Network Economics)
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