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A formula for the optimal taxation in Probabilistic Voting Models characterized by Single Mindedness

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Author Info
Canegrati, Emanuele

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Abstract

This work intends to specify a formula for the optimal taxation in Probabilistic Voting Models with Single Mindedness Theory. The goal is to find an equivalent expression to the Ramsey’s rule for a political economy environment where Governments are assumed to be Leviathans rather than benevolents.

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File URL: http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/1896/
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Publisher Info
Paper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number 1896.

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Date of creation: 23 Feb 2007
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Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:1896

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Related research
Keywords: probabilistic voting model single mindedness theory optimal taxation positive approach

Find related papers by JEL classification:
D63 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
H24 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Personal Income and Other Nonbusiness Taxes and Subsidies
H23 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Externalities; Redistributive Effects; Environmental Taxes and Subsidies
H21 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Efficiency; Optimal Taxation
D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
I38 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Welfare and Poverty - - - Government Programs; Provision and Effects of Welfare Programs
D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Models of Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
H31 - Public Economics - - Fiscal Policies and Behavior of Economic Agents - - - Household
H27 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Other Sources of Revenue
H53 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - Government Expenditures and Welfare Programs
D78 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Positive Analysis of Policy-Making and Implementation

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