Industrialization Jobs Creation and Wages Incentives
AbstractAn optimizing representative firm pays efficiency wages to skilled workers to produce technological innovations, which are assumed to be of labor saving type, affecting negatively the hiring rate of unskilled workers. The results are: i) The efficiency wage of skilled workers is determined by the Solow condition; ii) There is underemployment of unskilled workers whenever the added value of innovations is greater than the opportunity cost of skilled workers’ wages; iii) The optimal level of technology is independent of technological parameters; iv) The employment of skilled workers increases with the level of technology and decreases with the efficiency wage; v) The employment of unskilled workers is not necessarily negatively affected by technological innovations in the steady state.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number 17185.
Date of creation: 01 Sep 2009
Date of revision:
Unemployment; Dynamic Efficiency Wage Model; Technological Change;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- J41 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Particular Labor Markets - - - Labor Contracts
- O33 - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth - - Technological Change; Research and Development; Intellectual Property Rights - - - Technological Change: Choices and Consequences; Diffusion Processes
- D92 - Microeconomics - - Intertemporal Choice and Growth - - - Intertemporal Firm Choice and Growth, Financing, Investment, and Capacity
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2009-09-19 (All new papers)
- NEP-BEC-2009-09-19 (Business Economics)
- NEP-DGE-2009-09-19 (Dynamic General Equilibrium)
- NEP-LAB-2009-09-19 (Labour Economics)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Jellal, Mohamed & Zenou, Yves, 2000.
"A dynamic efficiency wage model with learning by doing,"
Elsevier, vol. 66(1), pages 99-105, January.
- Jellal, Mohamed & Zenou, Yves, 2000. "A dynamic efficiency wage model with learning by doing," MPRA Paper 38513, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Lin, Chung-cheng & Lai, Ching-chong, 1994. "The turnover costs and the Solow condition in an efficiency wage model with intertemporal optimization," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 45(4), pages 501-505, August.
- Faria, Joao Ricardo, 2000. "Supervision and effort in an intertemporal efficiency wage model: the role of the Solow condition," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 67(1), pages 93-98, April.
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