A Repeated Game Heterogeneous-Agent Wage-Posting Model
AbstractIn the paper, we simulate a heterogeneous-agent version of the wage-posting model as derived by Montgomery (1991) with homogeneous workers and differently-productive employers. Wage policy of particular employer is positively correlated with employer’s productivity level and the wage policy of the competitor. However, it is a less productive employer whose wage posting could also outweigh the posting of a more productive employer, though only temporarily.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number 16706.
Date of creation: Aug 2009
Date of revision:
Job-search model; Wage posting; Heterogeneous agents; Numerical optimization;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
- J31 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs - - - Wage Level and Structure; Wage Differentials
- D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search, Learning, and Information
- C15 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Econometric and Statistical Methods and Methodology: General - - - Statistical Simulation Methods: General
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2009-08-16 (All new papers)
- NEP-CMP-2009-08-16 (Computational Economics)
- NEP-GTH-2009-08-16 (Game Theory)
- NEP-LAB-2009-08-16 (Labour Economics)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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- Montgomery, James D, 1991. "Equilibrium Wage Dispersion and Interindustry Wage Differentials," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 106(1), pages 163-79, February.
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