Choosing the extent of private participation in public services: A computable general equilibrium perspective
AbstractWhat determines the propensity to reduce or widen the extent of public ownership? Why has there been a tendency to privatise and concede public utilities during the nineties? The answers to these questions depend both on macroeconomic and microeconomic considerations. And correct answers could also help to avoid or prevent inefficient reversals and frustrations that jeopardize reform processes. An alternative perspective, that combines micro and macro arguments, is given by general equilibrium models. The objective of this paper is to explore the rationality of the decision of choosing the implicit “technologies” of private and public operators of utilities in an economy that has fiscal budget and trade balance in equilibrium. The simulations confirm that the choice of the technology to be used for servicing infrastructure depends on deep parameters of efficiency and costs. The model shows that there are plausible scenarios where the selection is not unique.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number 15358.
Date of creation: Sep 2007
Date of revision:
Computable General Equilibrium; Trade balance; public services;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- C68 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Mathematical Methods; Programming Models; Mathematical and Simulation Modeling - - - Computable General Equilibrium Models
- F32 - International Economics - - International Finance - - - Current Account Adjustment; Short-term Capital Movements
- L97 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Transportation and Utilities - - - Utilities: General
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2009-06-17 (All new papers)
- NEP-CMP-2009-06-17 (Computational Economics)
- NEP-PBE-2009-06-17 (Public Economics)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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