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¿Puede el gobierno corporativo aprender del gobierno público?
[Can corporate governance learn from public governance?]

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  • Brugger Jakob, Samuel Immanuel

Abstract

In view of recent corporate scandals, it is argued that corporate governance can learn from public governance. Institutions devised to control and discipline the behaviour of executives in the political sphere can give new insights into how to improve the governance of firms. Some proposal such as division of power within firms, rules of succession in top positions, and institutionalized competition in core areas of corporations are discussed.

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File URL: http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/13857/
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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number 13857.

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Date of creation: Nov 2007
Date of revision: Apr 2008
Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:13857

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Keywords: Corporate Governance; Public Governance;

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  1. Anil Shivdasani & David Yermack, 1998. "CEO Involvement in the Selection of New Board Members: An Empirical Analysis," New York University, Leonard N. Stern School Finance Department Working Paper Seires, New York University, Leonard N. Stern School of Business- 98-059, New York University, Leonard N. Stern School of Business-.
  2. Jensen, Michael C & Murphy, Kevin J, 1990. "Performance Pay and Top-Management Incentives," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, University of Chicago Press, vol. 98(2), pages 225-64, April.
  3. Matthias Benz, 2006. "Was kann die Corporate Governance in der Schweiz von der Public Governance lernen?," IEW - Working Papers, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - University of Zurich 305, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - University of Zurich.
  4. John G. Matsusaka, 2005. "Direct Democracy Works," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 19(2), pages 185-206, Spring.
  5. Bruno S. Frey & Margit Osterloh, . "Yes, Managers Should be Paid Like Bureaucrats," IEW - Working Papers, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - University of Zurich 187, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - University of Zurich.
  6. Stefan Beiner & Wolfgang Drobetz & Markus M. Schmid & Heinz Zimmermann, 2006. "An Integrated Framework of Corporate Governance and Firm Valuation," European Financial Management, European Financial Management Association, European Financial Management Association, vol. 12(2), pages 249-283.
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