Analyse de l'impact des coûts de participation sur la stratégie des enchérisseurs dans les Prises de contrôle
[Participation costs and optimal strategy in takeovers]
AbstractWe consider a takeover in which risk neutral bidders must incur participation costs and study their optimal strategy. We found that bidders decision of participation is endogenous. There is a threshold of private participation cost above that a potential bidder will stay out of takeover process. Moreover, when he decides to participate in takeover, his optimal strategy is the submission of his own valuation for the target firm. However, a bidder without initial shareholdings and with low valuation can be completely deterred by the bidder with initial shareholdings. Indeed, a who gets toeholds in the target firm, overbids when he participates in takeover. This can led to an inefficient allocation.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number 13825.
Date of creation: 06 Mar 2009
Date of revision:
Partipation costs - Initial shareholdings - Private valuation - Overbidding - Takeovers;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing - - - Auctions
- G34 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Corporate Governance
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
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- Bradley, Michael, 1980. "Interfirm Tender Offers and the Market for Corporate Control," The Journal of Business, University of Chicago Press, vol. 53(4), pages 345-76, October.
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