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Market Power in Interactive Environmental and Energy Markets: The case of Green Certificates

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  • Amundsen, Eirik S.
  • Nese, Gjermund

Abstract

Markets for environmental externalities are typically closely related to the markets causing such externalities, whereupon strategic interactions may result. Along these lines, the market for Green Certificates is strongly interwoven in the electricity market as the producers of green electricity are also suppliers of Green Certificates. In this paper, we formulate an analytic equilibrium model for simultaneously functioning electricity and Green Certificates markets, and focus on the role of market power. We consider two versions of a Nash-Cournot game; a standard Nash-Cournot game where the players treat the market for Green Certificates and the electricity market as separate markets; and a Nash-Cournot game with endogenous treatment of the interaction between the electricity and Green Certificates markets with conjectured responses. One result is that a certificate system faced with market power may collapse into a system of per unit subsidies, as the producers involved start to game on the joint functioning of markets.

Suggested Citation

  • Amundsen, Eirik S. & Nese, Gjermund, 2004. "Market Power in Interactive Environmental and Energy Markets: The case of Green Certificates," MPRA Paper 10559, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    • Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:10559
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    File URL: https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/10559/1/MPRA_paper_10559.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Severin Borenstein & James Bushnell & Christopher R. Knittel, 1999. "Market Power in Electricity Markets: Beyond Concentration Measures," The Energy Journal, International Association for Energy Economics, vol. 0(Number 4), pages 65-88.
    2. Severin Borenstein & James Bushnell, 1999. "An Empirical Analysis of the Potential for Market Power in California’s Electricity Industry," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 47(3), pages 285-323, September.
    3. Amundsen, E.S. & Mortensen, J.B., 2001. "The Danish Green Certificate System: Some Simple Analytical Results," Norway; Department of Economics, University of Bergen 226, Department of Economics, University of Bergen.
    4. Amundsen, Eirik S. & Mortensen, Jorgen Birk, 2001. "The Danish Green Certificate System: some simple analytical results," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 23(5), pages 489-509, September.
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    Cited by:

    1. Ying, Zhou & Xin-gang, Zhao & Xue-feng, Jia & Zhen, Wang, 2021. "Can the Renewable Portfolio Standards improve social welfare in China's electricity market？," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 152(C).
    2. Nils‐Henrik M. von der Fehr & Stephanie Ropenus, 2017. "Renewable Energy Policy Instruments and Market Power," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 119(2), pages 312-345, April.
    3. Eirik S. Amundsen and Lars Bergman, 2012. "Green Certificates and Market Power on the Nordic Power Market," The Energy Journal, International Association for Energy Economics, vol. 0(Number 2).

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    renewable energy; electricity; Green Certificates; market power;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • Q28 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Renewable Resources and Conservation - - - Government Policy
    • Q48 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Energy - - - Government Policy
    • Q42 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Energy - - - Alternative Energy Sources
    • C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
    • A21 - General Economics and Teaching - - Economic Education and Teaching of Economics - - - Pre-college

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