Location, Information and Coordination

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Location, Information and Coordination

Author Info

Alexander Matros
Virginie Masson

Abstract

In this paper, we consider K finite populations of boundedly rational agents whose preferences and information differ. Each period agents are randomly paired to play some coordination games. We show that several "special" (fixed) agents lead the coordination. In a mistake-free environment, all connected fixed agents have to coordinate on the same strategy. In the long run, as the probability of mistakes goes to zero, all agents coordinate on the same strategy. The long-run outcome is unique, if all fixed agents belong to the same population.

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Paper provided by University of Pittsburgh, Department of Economics in its series Working Papers with number 307.

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Date of creation: Dec 2006
Date of revision: May 2007
Handle: RePEc:pit:wpaper:307

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NEP-ALL-2007-05-19 (All new papers)

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