Directed Search and Job Rotation
AbstractWe consider the impact of job rotation in a directed search model in which firm sizes are endogenously determined and match quality is initially unknown. A large firm benefits from the opportunity of rotating workers so as to partially overcome loss of mismatch. As a result, in the unique symmetric equilibrium, large firms have higher labor productivity and lower separation rates. In contrast to the standard directed search model with multi-vacancy firms, this model can generate a positive correlation between firm size and wage without introducing any ex ante productivity differences or imposing any non-concave production function assumption.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania in its series PIER Working Paper Archive with number 12-024.
Length: 21 pages
Date of creation: 03 Jun 2012
Date of revision:
Directed Search; Job Rotation; Firm Size and Wage; Firm Size and Labor Productivity;
Other versions of this item:
- L11 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Production, Pricing, and Market Structure; Size Distribution of Firms
- J31 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs - - - Wage Level and Structure; Wage Differentials
- J64 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Mobility, Unemployment, Vacancies, and Immigrant Workers - - - Unemployment: Models, Duration, Incidence, and Job Search
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2012-06-25 (All new papers)
- NEP-DGE-2012-06-25 (Dynamic General Equilibrium)
- NEP-LAB-2012-06-25 (Labour Economics)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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Blog mentionsAs found by EconAcademics.org, the blog aggregator for Economics research:CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
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