Evolution towards asymptotic efficiency, preliminary version
AbstractWe show that in long repeated games, or in infinitely repeated games with discount rate close to one, payoffs corresponding to evolutionary stable sets are asymptotically efficient, as intuition suggests. Actions played at the beginning of the game are used as messages that allow players to coordinate on Pareto optimal outcomes in the following stages. The result builds a bridge between the theory of repeated games and that of communication games.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University of Pavia, Department of Economics and Quantitative Methods in its series Quaderni di Dipartimento with number 173.
Length: 49 pages
Date of creation: May 2012
Date of revision:
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This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2012-06-05 (All new papers)
- NEP-EVO-2012-06-05 (Evolutionary Economics)
- NEP-GTH-2012-06-05 (Game Theory)
- NEP-HPE-2012-06-05 (History & Philosophy of Economics)
- NEP-MIC-2012-06-05 (Microeconomics)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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"From evolutionary to strategic stability,"
CORE Discussion Papers
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"The Simple Geometry of Perfect Information Games,"
115, Institute for Advanced Studies.
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