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Evolution towards asymptotic efficiency, preliminary version

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  • Stefano Demichelis

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    (Department of Economics and Business, University of Pavia)

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    Abstract

    We show that in long repeated games, or in infinitely repeated games with discount rate close to one, payoffs corresponding to evolutionary stable sets are asymptotically efficient, as intuition suggests. Actions played at the beginning of the game are used as messages that allow players to coordinate on Pareto optimal outcomes in the following stages. The result builds a bridge between the theory of repeated games and that of communication games.

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    File URL: http://economia.unipv.it/docs/dipeco/quad/ps/RePEc/pav/wpaper/q173.pdf
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    Bibliographic Info

    Paper provided by University of Pavia, Department of Economics and Quantitative Methods in its series Quaderni di Dipartimento with number 173.

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    Length: 49 pages
    Date of creation: May 2012
    Date of revision:
    Handle: RePEc:pav:wpaper:173

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    1. Demichelis, Stefano & Ritzberger, Klaus, 2003. "From evolutionary to strategic stability," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 113(1), pages 51-75, November.
    2. Fudenberg, Drew & Dreber, Anna & Rand, David G. & Nowak, Martin, 2008. "Winners Don't Punish," Scholarly Articles 2252594, Harvard University Department of Economics.
    3. Demichelis, Stefano & Ritzberger, Klaus & Swinkels, Jeroen M., 2002. "The Simple Geometry of Perfect Information Games," Economics Series 115, Institute for Advanced Studies.
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