The role of bribes in rural governance: The case of India
AbstractGiven that the phenomenon of capture of public programs by sections the population is rampant in developing countries, households can indulge in a strategy to improve their participating in public programs by bribing the suppliers of such programs. This is an important issue affecting both the supply of local public goods and the incidence of corruption. To the best of our knowledge there is no analysis of the impact of bribery on participating in a local public goods program, anywhere. Using a unique data set for rural India this paper addresses the question of whether households bribe elected officials responsible for assuring such supply to improve their access to local public goods. We find considerable evidence of such bribing. We also model the welfare effects of such bribing on groups of households as well as the impact of bribery on aggregate welfare. Several policy conclusions are advanced.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by The Australian National University, Australia South Asia Research Centre in its series ASARC Working Papers with number 2013-03.
Date of creation: 2013
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Bribery; Program Capture; Welfare Effects; Rural India.;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- D31 - Microeconomics - - Distribution - - - Personal Income and Wealth Distribution
- D63 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
- D73 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption
- O12 - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Microeconomic Analyses of Economic Development
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2013-04-27 (All new papers)
- NEP-DEV-2013-04-27 (Development)
- NEP-POL-2013-04-27 (Positive Political Economics)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Banerjee, Abhijit & Iyer, Lakshmi & Somanathan, Rohini, 2008.
"Public Action for Public Goods,"
Handbook of Development Economics,
- Abhijit Banerjee & Lakshmi Iyer & Rohini Somanathan, 2007. "Public Action for Public Goods," NBER Working Papers 12911, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Banerjee, Abhijit & Iyer, Lakshmi & Somanathan, Rohini, 2007. "Public Action for Public Goods," CEPR Discussion Papers 6154, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
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