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Is Trust Self-Fulfilling? An Experimental Study

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  • Michael Bacharach
  • Gerardo A. Guerra
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    Abstract

    A person is said to be `trust responsive` if she fulfils trust because she believes the truster trusts her. The experiment we report was designed to test for trust responsiveness and its robustness across payoff structures, and to disentangle it from other possible factors making for trustworthiness, including perceived kindness, perceived need, and inequality aversion. We elicit the truster`s confidence that the trustee will fulfil, and the trustee`s belief about the truster`s confidence after the trustee receives evidence relevant to this. We find evidence of strong trust responsiveness. We also find that perceptions of kindness and of need increase trust responsiveness, and that perceptions of kindness and need raise fulfilling rates only in conjunction with trust responsiveness.

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    File URL: http://www.economics.ox.ac.uk/materials/working_papers/paper076.pdf
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    Bibliographic Info

    Paper provided by University of Oxford, Department of Economics in its series Economics Series Working Papers with number 76.

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    Date of creation: 01 Oct 2001
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    Handle: RePEc:oxf:wpaper:76

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    Related research

    Keywords: trust game; experiment; trust responsiveness; kindness; need to trust; belief elicitation;

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    Cited by:
    1. Brian S. Collins & Robin Mansell, 2004. "Cyber trust and crime prevention: a synthesis of the state-of-the-art science reviews," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 4252, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    2. Pelligra, Vittorio, 2006. "Trust, Reciprocity and Institutional Design: Lessons from Behavioural Economics," AICCON Working Papers 37-2006, Associazione Italiana per la Cultura della Cooperazione e del Non Profit.
    3. Alessandro Innocenti & Maria Grazia Pazienza, 2006. "Altruism and Gender in the Trust Game," Labsi Experimental Economics Laboratory University of Siena 005, University of Siena.
    4. Gary Charness & Martin Dufwenberg, 2004. "Promises and Partnership," Levine's Bibliography 122247000000000001, UCLA Department of Economics.
    5. Alessandro Innocenti & Maria Grazia Pazienza, 2004. "Experimenter bias across gender differences," Department of Economics University of Siena 438, Department of Economics, University of Siena.
    6. Charness, Gary & Dufwenberg, Martin, 2003. "Promises & Partnership," Research Papers in Economics 2003:3, Stockholm University, Department of Economics.

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