Is Trust Self-Fulfilling? An Experimental Study
AbstractA person is said to be `trust responsive` if she fulfils trust because she believes the truster trusts her. The experiment we report was designed to test for trust responsiveness and its robustness across payoff structures, and to disentangle it from other possible factors making for trustworthiness, including perceived kindness, perceived need, and inequality aversion. We elicit the truster`s confidence that the trustee will fulfil, and the trustee`s belief about the truster`s confidence after the trustee receives evidence relevant to this. We find evidence of strong trust responsiveness. We also find that perceptions of kindness and of need increase trust responsiveness, and that perceptions of kindness and need raise fulfilling rates only in conjunction with trust responsiveness.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University of Oxford, Department of Economics in its series Economics Series Working Papers with number 76.
Date of creation: 01 Oct 2001
Date of revision:
trust game; experiment; trust responsiveness; kindness; need to trust; belief elicitation;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- C79 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Other
- C92 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Group Behavior
- D84 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Expectations; Speculations
You can help add them by filling out this form.
CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Brian S. Collins & Robin Mansell, 2004. "Cyber trust and crime prevention: a synthesis of the state-of-the-art science reviews," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 4252, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
- Pelligra, Vittorio, 2006. "Trust, Reciprocity and Institutional Design: Lessons from Behavioural Economics," AICCON Working Papers 37-2006, Associazione Italiana per la Cultura della Cooperazione e del Non Profit.
- Alessandro Innocenti & Maria Grazia Pazienza, 2006. "Altruism and Gender in the Trust Game," Labsi Experimental Economics Laboratory University of Siena 005, University of Siena.
- Gary Charness & Martin Dufwenberg, 2004.
"Promises and Partnership,"
122247000000000001, UCLA Department of Economics.
- Alessandro Innocenti & Maria Grazia Pazienza, 2004. "Experimenter bias across gender differences," Department of Economics University of Siena 438, Department of Economics, University of Siena.
- Charness, Gary & Dufwenberg, Martin, 2003.
"Promises & Partnership,"
Research Papers in Economics
2003:3, Stockholm University, Department of Economics.
- Charness, Gary B & Dufwenberg, Martin, 2006. "Promises & Partnership," University of California at Santa Barbara, Economics Working Paper Series qt0127h86v, Department of Economics, UC Santa Barbara.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Caroline Wise).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.