What shall we do with the bad dictator?
AbstractRecently, the international community has increased its commitment to prosecute malicious dictators - for example by establishing the International Criminal Court.� This has raised the international community's loss associated with being time-inconsistent (i.e.: granting amnesties ex post), the idea being that a reduced prospect of amnesty deters dictators from committing atrocities ex ante.� Simultaneously, however, this elects dictators of a worse type.� Moreover, when the costs of being time-inconsistent are lower than those associated with keeping the dictator in place, the international community will still grant amnesty - thereby making the effective punishment function non-monotonic.� Consequently, increased commitment to ex post punishment may actually induce dictators to worsen their behaviour, purely to "unlock" the amnesty option by forcing the international community into time-inconsistency.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University of Oxford, Department of Economics in its series Economics Series Working Papers with number 671.
Date of creation: 12 Sep 2013
Date of revision:
dictatorship; time-inconsistency; International Criminal Court; amnesty; institutions;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- F55 - International Economics - - International Relations, National Security, and International Political Economy - - - International Institutional Arrangements
- K14 - Law and Economics - - Basic Areas of Law - - - Criminal Law
- O12 - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Microeconomic Analyses of Economic Development
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