The Not-So-Absent-Minded Driver
AbstractThis paper starts with a re-examination of Piccione and Rubinstein`s Absent-Minded Driver problem, and suggests a novel interpretation of Aumann, Hart and Perry`s notion of action-optimality. We then consider several variants of the original problem in which the assumption that the player`s information sets partition the set of his decision nodes is relaxed. This relaxation enables us to construct a counter-example to Piccione and Rubinstein`s result that planning-optimal strategies are always action-optimal. We also show that an agent with more information may do worse than an agent with less.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University of Oxford, Department of Economics in its series Economics Series Working Papers with number 147.
Date of creation: 01 Mar 2003
Date of revision:
absentmindedness; action optimality;
Other versions of this item:
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- D81 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Piccione, Michele & Rubinstein, Ariel, 1997.
"On the Interpretation of Decision Problems with Imperfect Recall,"
Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier,
Elsevier, vol. 20(1), pages 3-24, July.
- Rubinstein, Ariel, 1995. "On the Interpretation of Decision Problems with Imperfect Recall," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 30(3), pages 324-324, December.
- Halpern, Joseph Y., 1997. "On Ambiguities in the Interpretation of Game Trees," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 20(1), pages 66-96, July.
- Aumann, Robert J. & Hart, Sergiu & Perry, Motty, 1997. "The Absent-Minded Driver," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 20(1), pages 102-116, July.
- Aumann, Robert & Brandenburger, Adam, 1995. "Epistemic Conditions for Nash Equilibrium," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 63(5), pages 1161-80, September.
- Oliver Board, 2002. "The Deception of the Greeks: Generalizing the Information Structure of Extensive Form Games," Economics Series Working Papers 137, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
- Board, Oliver, 2004.
"Dynamic interactive epistemology,"
Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier,
Elsevier, vol. 49(1), pages 49-80, October.
- M. Levati & Matthias Uhl & Ro’i Zultan, 2014.
"Imperfect recall and time inconsistencies: an experimental test of the absentminded driver “paradox”,"
International Journal of Game Theory, Springer,
Springer, vol. 43(1), pages 65-88, February.
- Vittoria M. Levati & Matthias Uhl & Ro'i Zultan, 2010. "Imperfect Recall and Time Inconsistencies: An experimental test of the absentminded driver "paradox"," Jena Economic Research Papers, Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena, Max-Planck-Institute of Economics 2010-035, Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena, Max-Planck-Institute of Economics.
- Jean Baratgin & Bernard Walliser, 2010. "Sleeping Beauty and the absent-minded driver," Theory and Decision, Springer, Springer, vol. 69(3), pages 489-496, September.
- Sudipta Sarangi & Cary Deck, . "Inducing Absent-Mindedness in the Lab," Departmental Working Papers, Department of Economics, Louisiana State University 2006-09, Department of Economics, Louisiana State University.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Caroline Wise).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.