Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login to save this paper or follow this series

The Not-So-Absent-Minded Driver

Contents:

Author Info

  • Oliver Board

Abstract

This paper starts with a re-examination of Piccione and Rubinstein`s Absent-Minded Driver problem, and suggests a novel interpretation of Aumann, Hart and Perry`s notion of action-optimality. We then consider several variants of the original problem in which the assumption that the player`s information sets partition the set of his decision nodes is relaxed. This relaxation enables us to construct a counter-example to Piccione and Rubinstein`s result that planning-optimal strategies are always action-optimal. We also show that an agent with more information may do worse than an agent with less.

Download Info

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
File URL: http://www.economics.ox.ac.uk/materials/working_papers/paper147.pdf
Download Restriction: no

Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by University of Oxford, Department of Economics in its series Economics Series Working Papers with number 147.

as in new window
Length:
Date of creation: 01 Mar 2003
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:oxf:wpaper:147

Contact details of provider:
Postal: Manor Rd. Building, Oxford, OX1 3UQ
Email:
Web page: http://www.economics.ox.ac.uk/
More information through EDIRC

Related research

Keywords: absentmindedness; action optimality;

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:

References

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
as in new window
  1. Piccione, Michele & Rubinstein, Ariel, 1997. "On the Interpretation of Decision Problems with Imperfect Recall," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 20(1), pages 3-24, July.
  2. Halpern, Joseph Y., 1997. "On Ambiguities in the Interpretation of Game Trees," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 20(1), pages 66-96, July.
  3. Aumann, Robert J. & Hart, Sergiu & Perry, Motty, 1997. "The Absent-Minded Driver," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 20(1), pages 102-116, July.
  4. Aumann, Robert & Brandenburger, Adam, 1995. "Epistemic Conditions for Nash Equilibrium," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 63(5), pages 1161-80, September.
  5. Oliver Board, 2002. "The Deception of the Greeks: Generalizing the Information Structure of Extensive Form Games," Economics Series Working Papers 137, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

Citations

Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
as in new window

Cited by:
  1. Board, Oliver, 2004. "Dynamic interactive epistemology," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 49(1), pages 49-80, October.
  2. M. Levati & Matthias Uhl & Ro’i Zultan, 2014. "Imperfect recall and time inconsistencies: an experimental test of the absentminded driver “paradox”," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, Springer, vol. 43(1), pages 65-88, February.
  3. Jean Baratgin & Bernard Walliser, 2010. "Sleeping Beauty and the absent-minded driver," Theory and Decision, Springer, Springer, vol. 69(3), pages 489-496, September.
  4. Sudipta Sarangi & Cary Deck, . "Inducing Absent-Mindedness in the Lab," Departmental Working Papers, Department of Economics, Louisiana State University 2006-09, Department of Economics, Louisiana State University.

Lists

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Corrections

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:oxf:wpaper:147. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Caroline Wise).

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.