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The Absent-minded Centipede (revision)

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Author Info
Uwe Dulleck (Humboldt University, Berlin)
Joerg Oechssler (Humboldt University, Berlin)

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Abstract

In this note we apply the notion of absent-mindedness (see Piccione and Rubinstein, 1994), which is a form of imperfect recall, to Rosenthal's (1981) centipede game. We show that for standard versions of the centipede game a subgame perfect equilibrium exists in which play is continued almost to the end if one player is known to be absent-minded. In fact, it is sufficient that one player is known to be absent-minded with sufficiently high probability.

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by EconWPA in its series Game Theory and Information with number 9610005.

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Length: 8 pages
Date of creation: 08 Oct 1996
Date of revision: 11 Oct 1996
Handle: RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:9610005

Note: 8 pages, this revision actually contains Figure 1.
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Find related papers by JEL classification:
C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games

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  1. Rubinstein, Ariel, 1995. "On the Interpretation of Decision Problems with Imperfect Recall," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 30(3), pages 324-324, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  2. Aumann, Robert J. & Hart, Sergiu & Perry, Motty, 1997. "The Absent-Minded Driver," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 20(1), pages 102-116, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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This page was last updated on 2009-6-25.

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