The absent-minded prisoner
AbstractIf one of two rational players is absent-minded for at least three rounds, cooperation in a prisoners dilemma with a finite number of repetitions is possible. If both players are absentminded, even two rounds of absent-mindedness can be enough for cooperation in these rounds and all rounds before. Sufficient conditions for the existence of a cooperative equilibrium are derived, a plausible interpretation of absent-mindedness in the case of many repetitions is given. --
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Ernst Moritz Arndt University of Greifswald, Faculty of Law and Economics in its series Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Diskussionspapiere with number 14/1998.
Date of creation: 1998
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absent-mindedness; prisoners dilemma; repeated games;
Other versions of this item:
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
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