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The absent-minded prisoner

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  • Dilger, Alexander

Abstract

If one of two rational players is absent-minded for at least three rounds, cooperation in a prisoners dilemma with a finite number of repetitions is possible. If both players are absentminded, even two rounds of absent-mindedness can be enough for cooperation in these rounds and all rounds before. Sufficient conditions for the existence of a cooperative equilibrium are derived, a plausible interpretation of absent-mindedness in the case of many repetitions is given.

Suggested Citation

  • Dilger, Alexander, 1998. "The absent-minded prisoner," Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Diskussionspapiere 14/1998, University of Greifswald, Faculty of Law and Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:zbw:grewdp:141998
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Kreps, David M. & Milgrom, Paul & Roberts, John & Wilson, Robert, 1982. "Rational cooperation in the finitely repeated prisoners' dilemma," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 27(2), pages 245-252, August.
    2. Piccione, Michele & Rubinstein, Ariel, 1997. "The Absent-Minded Driver's Paradox: Synthesis and Responses," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 20(1), pages 121-130, July.
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    6. Aumann, Robert J. & Hart, Sergiu & Perry, Motty, 1997. "The Absent-Minded Driver," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 20(1), pages 102-116, July.
    7. Dulleck, Uwe & Oechssler, Jorg, 1997. "The absent-minded centipede," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 55(3), pages 309-315, September.
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    Cited by:

    1. Ferreira, José Luis & Kujal, Praveen & Rassenti, Stephen, 2009. "The strategic motive to sell forward: experimental evidence," UC3M Working papers. Economics we092616, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de Economía.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    absent-mindedness; prisoners dilemma; repeated games;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games

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