Preemptive Investment Game with Alternative Projects
AbstractThis paper derives a preemptive equilibrium in strategic investment in alternative projects. The problem is formulated in a real options model with a multidimensional state variable that represents project-specific uncertainty. The proposed method enables us to evaluate the value of potential alternatives. The results not only extend previous studies with a one-dimensional state variable but also reveal new findings. Preemptive investment takes place earlier and the project value becomes lower if the numbers of both firms and projects increase by the same amount. Interestingly, a strong correlation among profits from projects, unlike in a monopoly, plays a positive role in moderating preemptive competition.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Osaka University, Graduate School of Economics and Osaka School of International Public Policy (OSIPP) in its series Discussion Papers in Economics and Business with number 09-16.
Length: 21 pages
Date of creation: Jun 2009
Date of revision:
strategic real options; preemption; alternative projects; stopping game.;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
- G13 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Contingent Pricing; Futures Pricing
- G31 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Capital Budgeting; Fixed Investment and Inventory Studies
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2009-06-17 (All new papers)
- NEP-BEC-2009-06-17 (Business Economics)
- NEP-GTH-2009-06-17 (Game Theory)
- NEP-PPM-2009-06-17 (Project, Program & Portfolio Management)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Grenadier, Steven R. & Wang, Neng, 2005.
"Investment timing, agency, and information,"
Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier,
Elsevier, vol. 75(3), pages 493-533, March.
- Grenadier, Steven R, 1996. " The Strategic Exercise of Options: Development Cascades and Overbuilding in Real Estate Markets," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, American Finance Association, vol. 51(5), pages 1653-79, December.
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