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Policy Durability, Agency Capacity, and Executive Unilateralism

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  • Turner, Ian R

    (Yale University)

Abstract

In this essay I argue that the need to motivate bureaucrats to invest in high quality policy implementation alters the appeal of executive unilateralism. If executive orders are less durable than legislation, then the bureaucracy will have weaker incentives to invest in policymaking. This affects presidents’ willingness to compromise and work with Congress to pass legislation, rather than pursue unilateral action. Unilateralism becomes less attractive as bureaucratic capacity increases and as the relative durability of executive orders decreases. I formalize this logic in a simple formal model and discuss fruitful extensions for future work.

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  • Turner, Ian R, 2021. "Policy Durability, Agency Capacity, and Executive Unilateralism," SocArXiv stnzf, Center for Open Science.
    • Handle: RePEc:osf:socarx:stnzf
    DOI: 10.31219/osf.io/stnzf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
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