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Regulatory Analysis Procedures and Political Influence on Bureaucratic Policymaking

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  • Neal D. Woods

Abstract

Well‐known theories suggest that administrative procedures may be used as mechanisms of political control of the bureaucracy. This study investigates whether three common regulatory analysis procedures—cost‐benefit analysis, risk assessment, and economic impact analysis—lead to greater influence by political officials on bureaucratic policymaking. Multivariate analyses of data from a unique survey of state administrators indicate that regulatory analysis requirements are associated with decreases in the perceived influence of elected political officials on the content of administrative rules. This association is particularly evident in cases where proposed rules are subjected to a cost–benefit test. These findings contradict prominent theories of administrative procedures, but are consistent with recent research on the political power of administrative agencies.

Suggested Citation

  • Neal D. Woods, 2018. "Regulatory Analysis Procedures and Political Influence on Bureaucratic Policymaking," Regulation & Governance, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 12(2), pages 299-313, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:wly:reggov:v:12:y:2018:i:2:p:299-313
    DOI: 10.1111/rego.12139
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    5. Spence, David B, 1999. "Managing Delegation Ex Ante: Using Law to Steer Administrative Agencies," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 28(2), pages 413-459, June.
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    Cited by:

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    2. Branden B. Johnson & Adam M. Finkel, 2023. "Sensitivity to scope in estimating the social benefits of prolonging lives for regulatory decisions using national stated preference tradeoffs," Environment Systems and Decisions, Springer, vol. 43(3), pages 509-528, September.

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