IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/wly/reggov/v15y2021is1ps8-s22.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Politicians, regulators, and regulatory governance: The neglected sides of the story

Author

Listed:
  • Cyril Benoît

Abstract

We offer a series of reflective insights about the state and direction of studies related to the politics of regulation. Notably we argue that the field is characterized by persisting divisions between Americanists and Europeanists. Largely focused on the actions taken by political principals, the former regularly report a substantial politicization of regulatory behavior. Reflecting on recent developments in US politics however, we show that political influence could be overestimated in the United States. Symmetrically, this same influence could be underestimated by Europeanists, who for now have largely focused on regulators and agencies. This is notably suggested by a discussion of recent development in European politics, as revealed by contributions systematically measuring agency politicization in Western European democracies. On this basis, we identify some promising research questions and agendas for future studies on the politics of regulation.

Suggested Citation

  • Cyril Benoît, 2021. "Politicians, regulators, and regulatory governance: The neglected sides of the story," Regulation & Governance, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 15(S1), pages 8-22, November.
    • Handle: RePEc:wly:reggov:v:15:y:2021:i:s1:p:s8-s22
    DOI: 10.1111/rego.12388
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://doi.org/10.1111/rego.12388
    Download Restriction: no
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1111/rego.12388?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Ramseyer,J. Mark & Rosenbluth,Frances McCall, 1998. "The Politics of Oligarchy," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521636490.
    2. George J. Stigler, 1971. "The Theory of Economic Regulation," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 2(1), pages 3-21, Spring.
    3. Bawn, Kathleen, 1995. "Political Control Versus Expertise: Congressional Choices about Administrative Procedures," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 89(1), pages 62-73, March.
    4. Baldwin, Robert & Cave, Martin & Lodge, Martin, 2011. "Understanding Regulation: Theory, Strategy, and Practice," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, edition 2, number 9780199576098.
    5. Fabrizio Gilardi, 2008. "Delegation in the Regulatory State," Books, Edward Elgar Publishing, number 12818.
    6. Busuioc, E. M. & Lodge, Martin, 2017. "Reputation and accountability relationships: managing accountability expectations through reputation," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 67152, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    7. McCubbins, Mathew D & Noll, Roger G & Weingast, Barry R, 1987. "Administrative Procedures as Instruments of Political Control," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 3(2), pages 243-277, Fall.
    8. Weingast, Barry R & Moran, Mark J, 1983. "Bureaucratic Discretion or Congressional Control? Regulatory Policymaking by the Federal Trade Commission," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 91(5), pages 765-800, October.
    9. Paulo Correa & Marcus Melo & Bernardo Mueller & Carlos Pereira, 2019. "Political interference and regulatory resilience in Brazil," Regulation & Governance, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 13(4), pages 540-560, December.
    10. Chris Hanretty & Christel Koop, 2013. "Shall the law set them free? The formal and actual independence of regulatory agencies," Regulation & Governance, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 7(2), pages 195-214, June.
    11. Julia Black, 2008. "Constructing and contesting legitimacy and accountability in polycentric regulatory regimes," Regulation & Governance, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 2(2), pages 137-164, June.
    12. James, Oliver & Petrovsky, Nicolai & Moseley, Alice & Boyne, George A., 2016. "The Politics of Agency Death: Ministers and the Survival of Government Agencies in a Parliamentary System," British Journal of Political Science, Cambridge University Press, vol. 46(4), pages 763-784, October.
    13. Bawn, Kathleen, 1997. "Choosing Strategies to Control the Bureaucracy: Statutory Constraints, Oversight, and the Committee System," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 13(1), pages 101-126, April.
    14. Baldwin, Robert & Cave, Martin & Lodge, Martin (ed.), 2010. "The Oxford Handbook of Regulation," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780199560219, Decembrie.
    15. Jean-Jacques Laffont & Jean Tirole, 1993. "A Theory of Incentives in Procurement and Regulation," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262121743, December.
    16. Moshe Maor, 2016. "Missing Areas in the Bureaucratic Reputation Framework," Politics and Governance, Cogitatio Press, vol. 4(2), pages 80-90.
    17. Chang, Ha-Joon, 1997. "The Economics and Politics of Regulation," Cambridge Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 21(6), pages 703-728, November.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Thomas Braendle & Alois Stutzer, 2013. "Political selection of public servants and parliamentary oversight," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 14(1), pages 45-76, February.
    2. Moszoro, Marian W. & Spiller, Pablo T., 2014. "Third-Party Opportunism and the Theory of Public Contracts: Operationalization and Applications," MPRA Paper 101592, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    3. Ian R Turner, 2017. "Working smart and hard? Agency effort, judicial review, and policy precision," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 29(1), pages 69-96, January.
    4. Kwan Nok Chan & Shiwei Fan, 2021. "Friction and bureaucratic control in authoritarian regimes," Regulation & Governance, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 15(4), pages 1406-1418, October.
    5. Lee, Changyen & Cheng, Chun-Fa & Chuang, Min-Ta & Hsu, Wei-Chieh & Chen, Yen-Hung & Cheng, Kuo-Tai, 2018. "How transparency and accountability matter in regulating the Taiwan Water Supply Corporation," Utilities Policy, Elsevier, vol. 52(C), pages 50-58.
    6. Lehr, William & Sicker, Douglas, 2017. "Communications Act 2021," 28th European Regional ITS Conference, Passau 2017 169478, International Telecommunications Society (ITS).
    7. Michael Makowsky & Thomas Stratmann, 2014. "Politics, unemployment, and the enforcement of immigration law," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 160(1), pages 131-153, July.
    8. Ando, Amy, 1998. "Delay on the Path to the Endangered Species List: Do Costs and Benefits Matter," RFF Working Paper Series dp-97-43-rev, Resources for the Future.
    9. Abbott, Kenneth W. & Genschel, Philipp & Snidal, Duncan & Zangl, Bernhard, 2018. "The governor's dilemma: Competence versus control in indirect governance," Discussion Papers, Research Unit: Global Governance SP IV 2018-101, WZB Berlin Social Science Center.
    10. P. Hägg, 1997. "Theories on the Economics of Regulation: A Survey of the Literature from a European Perspective," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 4(4), pages 337-370, December.
    11. Min-Seok Pang, 2017. "Politics and Information Technology Investments in the U.S. Federal Government in 2003–2016," Information Systems Research, INFORMS, vol. 28(1), pages 33-45, March.
    12. Ando, Amy Whritenour, 1999. "Waiting to Be Protected under the Endangered Species Act: The Political Economy of Regulatory Delay," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 42(1), pages 29-60, April.
    13. Christian Jaag & Urs Trinkner, 2011. "A General Framework for Regulation and Liberalization in Network Industries," Chapters, in: Matthias Finger & Rolf W. Künneke (ed.), International Handbook of Network Industries, chapter 3, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    14. Mary K. Olson, 1997. "Firm Characteristics and the Speed of FDA Approval," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 6(1), pages 377-401, June.
    15. Lampropoulou, Manto & Ladi, Stella, 2020. "The role and performance of independent regulatory agencies in post-crisis Greece," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 103705, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    16. Fremeth, Adam R. & Holburn, Guy L. F. & Piazza, Alessandro, 2021. "Activist Protest Spillovers into the Regulatory Domain: Theory and Evidence from the U.S. Nuclear Power Generation Industry," OSF Preprints s39h2, Center for Open Science.
    17. Mattia Guidi, 2011. "Does Independence Affect Regulatory Performance? The case of national competition authorities in the European Union," EUI-RSCAS Working Papers 64, European University Institute (EUI), Robert Schuman Centre of Advanced Studies (RSCAS).
    18. Sean Gailmard, 2009. "Multiple Principals and Oversight of Bureaucratic Policy-Making," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 21(2), pages 161-186, April.
    19. Aad Correlje & John Groenewegen & Jan Jaap Bouma, 2012. "The Regulated Firm in Liberalized Network Industries," Chapters, in: Michael Dietrich & Jackie Krafft (ed.), Handbook on the Economics and Theory of the Firm, chapter 37, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    20. Jean‐Michel Glachant, 2008. "La Deregulation Des Industries De Reseaux Comme Politique Institutionnelle De Creation De Marches Et De Mecanismes De Gouvernance," Annals of Public and Cooperative Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 79(3‐4), pages 487-525, September.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:wly:reggov:v:15:y:2021:i:s1:p:s8-s22. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Wiley Content Delivery (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://doi.org/10.1111/(ISSN)1748-5991 .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.