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Mechanismen der Politik: Strategische Interaktion im deutschen Regierungssystem

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  • Ganghof, Steffen
  • Manow, Philip
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    Abstract

    Nach welchen Mechanismen funktioniert Politik in Deutschland? Die Autoren beleuchten das Zusammenspiel zwischen Regierung, Bundestag und Bundesrat, die Sicherung von Koalitions- und Abstimmungsdisziplin, die Politik des Bundesverfassungsgerichts sowie die politische Kontrolle der Bürokratie. Sie zeigen, inwieweit sich zielorientierte Akteure an institutionelle Anreize und Beschränkungen anpassen und welche wiederkehrenden Muster strategischen Verhaltens in den politischen Prozessen von zentraler Bedeutung sind. --

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    Bibliographic Info

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    This book is provided by Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies in its series Schriften aus dem Max-Planck-Institut für Gesellschaftsforschung Köln with number 54 and published in 2005.

    Volume: 54
    Handle: RePEc:zbw:mpifgs:54

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    1. Spence, David B, 1999. "Managing Delegation Ex Ante: Using Law to Steer Administrative Agencies," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, University of Chicago Press, vol. 28(2), pages 413-59, June.
    2. McCubbins, Mathew D & Noll, Roger G & Weingast, Barry R, 1987. "Administrative Procedures as Instruments of Political Control," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, Oxford University Press, vol. 3(2), pages 243-77, Fall.
    3. Ferejohn, John A. & Weingast, Barry R., 1992. "A positive theory of statutory interpretation," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 12(2), pages 263-279, June.
    4. Hausman, Daniel M., 2000. "Revealed preference, belief, and game theory," Economics and Philosophy, Cambridge University Press, vol. 16(01), pages 99-115, April.
    5. Altemeier, Jens, 1999. "Föderale Finanzbeziehungen unter Anpassungsdruck: Verteilungskonflikte in der Verhandlungsdemokratie," Schriften aus dem Max-Planck-Institut für Gesellschaftsforschung Köln, Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies, volume 38, number 38.
    6. Landes, William M & Posner, Richard A, 1975. "The Independent Judiciary in an Interest-Group Perspective," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, University of Chicago Press, vol. 18(3), pages 875-901, December.
    7. Ramseyer, J Mark, 1994. "The Puzzling (In)dependence of Courts: A Comparative Approach," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, University of Chicago Press, vol. 23(2), pages 721-47, June.
    8. McKelvey, Richard D., 1976. "Intransitivities in multidimensional voting models and some implications for agenda control," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 12(3), pages 472-482, June.
    9. Ferejohn, John & Shipan, Charles, 1990. "Congressional Influence on Bureaucracy," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, Oxford University Press, vol. 6(0), pages 1-20.
    10. Davis, Otto A & DeGroot, Morris H & Hinich, Melvin J, 1972. "Social Preference Orderings and Majority Rule," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 40(1), pages 147-57, January.
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