Game Forms with Minimal Strategy Spaces
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Paper provided by Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science in its series Discussion Papers with number 663.Length:
Date of creation: Jul 1985
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Handle: RePEc:nwu:cmsems:663
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Citations
Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.Cited by:
- Calsamiglia, Xavier & Kirman, Alan, 1993.
"A Unique Informationally Efficient and Decentralized Mechanism with Fair Outcomes,"
Econometrica,
Econometric Society, vol. 61(5), pages 1147-72, September.
- Xavier Calsamiglia & Alan Kirman, 1991. "A unique informationally efficient and decentralized mechanism with fair outcomes," Economics Working Papers 7, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra.
- Guoqiang Tian, 2010. "Implementation of marginal cost pricing equilibrium allocations with transfers in economies with increasing returns to scale," Review of Economic Design, Springer, vol. 14(1), pages 163-184, March.
- Takashi Ishikida & Thomas Marschak, 1996. "Mechanisms that efficiently verify the optimality of a proposed action," Review of Economic Design, Springer, vol. 2(1), pages 33-68, December.
- Thomas Marschak, 1996. "On economies of scope in communication," Review of Economic Design, Springer, vol. 2(1), pages 1-31, December.
- Tian, Guoqiang, 2001. "The Unique Informational Effciency of the Lindahl Allocation Process in Economies with Public Goods," MPRA Paper 41229, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised Oct 2005.
- Tian, Guoqiang & Li, Qi, 1995. "Ratio-Lindahl equilibria and an informationally efficient and implementable mixed-ownership system," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 26(3), pages 391-411, May.
- Choi, Jaewon & Kim, Taesung, 1999. "A Nonparametric, Efficient Public Good Decision Mechanism: Undominated Bayesian Implementation," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 27(1), pages 64-85, April.
- Guoqiang Tian, 2006. "The unique informational efficiency of the competitive mechanism in economies with production," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 26(1), pages 155-182, January.
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