Long-Term Contracting in a Changing World
AbstractI study the properties of optimal long-term contracts in an environment in which the agents type evolves stochastically over time. The model stylizes a buyer-seller relationship but the results apply quite naturally to many contractual situations including regulation and optimal income-taxation. I rst show, through a simple example, that distortions need not vanish over time and need not be monotonic in the shock to the buyers valuation. These results are in contrast to those obtained in the literature that assumes a Markov process with a binary state space e.g. Battaglini, 2005. I then show that when the sets of possible types in any two adja- cent periods satisfy a certain overlapping condition (which is always satis ed with a continuum of types), then the dynamics of the optimal mechanism can be signi cantly simpli ed by as- suming the shocks are independent over time. Under certain regularity conditions, the optimal mechanism is then the same irrespective of whether the shocks are the buyers private informa- tion or are observed also by the seller. These conditions are satis ed, for example, in the case of an AR(1) process, a Brownian motion, but also when shocks have a multiplicative e¤ect as it is often the case in nancial applications. Furthermore, the distortions in the optimal quantities are independent of the distributions of the shocks and, when the buyers valuation is additively separable, they are also independent of whether the shocks are transitory or permanent. Finally, I show that assuming the shocks are independent not only greatly simpli es the analysis but is actually without loss of generality with a continuum of types.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science in its series Discussion Papers with number 1456.
Date of creation: Dec 2007
Date of revision:
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Postal: Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science, Northwestern University, 580 Jacobs Center, 2001 Sheridan Road, Evanston, IL 60208-2014
Web page: http://www.kellogg.northwestern.edu/research/math/
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Other versions of this item:
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
- L1 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance
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- Stephen Coate & Marco Battaglini, 2004.
"Pareto Efficient Income Taxation with Stochastic Abilities,"
2004 Meeting Papers
140, Society for Economic Dynamics.
- Battaglini, Marco & Coate, Stephen, 2008. "Pareto efficient income taxation with stochastic abilities," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 92(3-4), pages 844-868, April.
- Marco Battaglini & Stephen Coate, 2003. "Pareto Efficient Income Taxation with Stochastic Abilities," NBER Working Papers 10119, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Pascal Courty & Li Hao, 1997.
Economics Working Papers
224, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra.
- Marco Battaglini, 2003.
"Long-Term Contracting with Markovian Consumers,"
Theory workshop papers
505798000000000048, UCLA Department of Economics.
- repec:bla:restud:v:74:y:2007:i:3:p:705-731 is not listed on IDEAS
- Deb, Rahul, 2008. "Optimal Contracting Of New Experience Goods," MPRA Paper 9880, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Ralph Boleslavsky & Maher Said, 2011.
"Progressive Screening: Long-Term Contracting with a Privately Known Stochastic Process,"
2011-5, University of Miami, Department of Economics.
- Raphael Boleslavsky & Maher Said, 2013. "Progressive Screening: Long-Term Contracting with a Privately Known Stochastic Process," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 80(1), pages 1-34.
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