Economic Analysis of Constitutions
AbstractThis paper is a preliminary draft of an article to appear in Chicago Law Review (2000), as part of a symposium reviewing two new books on economic analysis of constitutions: Dennis Mueller's Constitutional Democracy and Robert Cooter's Strategic Constitution. Some of the basic questions of constitutional analysis are introduced, and the importance of work in this area is shown as one of the major new developments in social theory. The methods of economic theory are then shown to be particularly appropriate and useful for such constitutional analysis. The author then tries to follow Cooter and Mueller in sketching some of the most important results of economic analysis of constitutional structures, but finds a perspective quite different from theirs.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science in its series Discussion Papers with number 1291.
Date of creation: Mar 2000
Date of revision:
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Postal: Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science, Northwestern University, 580 Jacobs Center, 2001 Sheridan Road, Evanston, IL 60208-2014
Web page: http://www.kellogg.northwestern.edu/research/math/
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This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2000-10-05 (All new papers)
- NEP-PBE-2000-10-05 (Public Economics)
- NEP-POL-2000-10-05 (Positive Political Economics)
- NEP-REG-2000-10-05 (Regulation)
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