The Simple Economics of Open Source
AbstractThere has been a recent surge of interest in open source software development, which involves developers at many different locations and organizations sharing code to develop and refine programs. To an economist, the behavior of individual programmers and commercial companies engaged in open source projects is initially startling. This paper makes a preliminary exploration of the economics of open source software. We highlight the extent to which labor economics, especially the literature on career concerns,' can explain many of these projects' features. Aspects of the future of open source development process, however, remain somewhat difficult to predict with off-the-shelf' economic models.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc in its series NBER Working Papers with number 7600.
Date of creation: Mar 2000
Date of revision:
Publication status: published as "Some Simple Economics of Open Source," Journal of Industrial Economics, 52 (June 2002) 197-234.
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Find related papers by JEL classification:
- L22 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Firm Organization and Market Structure
- L31 - Industrial Organization - - Nonprofit Organizations and Public Enterprise - - - Nonprofit Institutions; NGOs
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2000-03-20 (All new papers)
- NEP-IND-2000-03-20 (Industrial Organization)
- NEP-INO-2000-03-20 (Innovation)
- NEP-MIC-2000-03-20 (Microeconomics)
- NEP-TID-2000-03-21 (Technology & Industrial Dynamics)
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