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When Can Public Policy Makers Rely on Private Markets? The Effective Provision of Social Services

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Rebecca M. Blank

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Abstract

The privatization of social services is being increasingly discussed. The social services market is characterized by multiple market failures, including informational asymmetries, agency problems, externalities, and distributional concerns. Consumers may care as much or more about quality of services than about price. If quality is readily observable, the government can regulate private providers to assure standards are met. But when standards are difficult to observe or when the recipient is not the agent who makes the decisions, government ownership may be preferable. This paper categorizes the market situations in which the government provision of social services is likely to be most versus least attractive.

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Paper provided by National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc in its series NBER Working Papers with number 7099.

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Date of creation: Apr 1999
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Publication status: published as Economic Journal, Vol. 110, no. 462 (March 2000): C34-C49.
Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:7099

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
H11 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - Structure and Scope of Government
I00 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - General - - - General

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References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Vining, Aidan R & Boardman, Anthony E, 1992. " Ownership versus Competition: Efficiency in Public Enterprise," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 73(2), pages 205-39, March.
  2. Hart, Oliver & Shleifer, Andrei & Vishny, Robert W, 1997. "The Proper Scope of Government: Theory and an Application to Prisons," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 112(4), pages 1127-61, November.
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  3. Andrei Shleifer, 1998. "State Versus Private Ownership," NBER Working Papers 6665, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  4. Tobin, James, 1970. "On Limiting the Domain of Inequality," Journal of Law & Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 13(2), pages 263-77, October.
  5. Greenwald, Bruce C & Stiglitz, Joseph E, 1986. "Externalities in Economies with Imperfect Information and Incomplete Markets," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 101(2), pages 229-64, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. David E. M. Sappington & Joseph E. Stiglitz, 1988. "Privatization, Information and Incentives," NBER Working Papers 2196, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Juan F. Jimeno, . "Incentivos y desigualdad en el sistema español de pensiones contributivas de jubilación," Working Papers 2002-13, FEDEA. [Downloadable!]
  2. Rebecca M. Blank, 2002. "Can Equity and Efficiency Complement Each Other?," NBER Working Papers 8820, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  3. Argentino Pessoa, 2008. "Educational Reform in Developing Countries: Private Involvement and Partnerships," FEP Working Papers 284, Universidade do Porto, Faculdade de Economia do Porto. [Downloadable!]
  4. Mark Pearson & John P. Martin, 2005. "Should We Extend the Role of Private Social Expenditure?," IZA Discussion Papers 1544, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA). [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  5. Juan F. Jimeno, . "El sistema de pensiones contributivas en España: Cuestiones básicas y perspectivas en el medio plazo," Working Papers 2000-15, FEDEA. [Downloadable!]
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This page was last updated on 2008-11-16.


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