The Choice of Monetary Instrument in Two Interdependent Economies Under Uncertainty
AbstractThis paper analyzes the choice of monetary instrument in a stochastic two country setting where each country's set of monetary policy instruments includes both the money supply and the interest rate. It shows how the optimal choice of instrument is determined In two stages. First, for each pair, the minimum welfare coat for each economy is determined This defines a par of payoff matrices and the second stage involves determining the Nash equilibrium for this bimatrix game. In our illustrative example for the alternative shocks considered, a dominant Nash equilibrium is always obtained.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc in its series NBER Working Papers with number 2604.
Date of creation: Jun 1988
Date of revision:
Publication status: published as Journal of Monetary Economics, Vol. 23, No. 1, pp. 121-133, (1989).
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- Turnovsky, Stephen J. & d'Orey, Vasco, 1989. "The choice of monetary instrument in two interdependent economies under uncertainty," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 23(1), pages 121-133, January.
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