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Optimal Monetary Policy with Asymmetric Targets

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  • Peter J. Stemp
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    Abstract

    We investigate the derivation of optimal interest rate rules in a simple stochastic framework. The monetary authority chooses to minimise an asymmetric loss function made up of the sum of squared components, where the monetary authority places positive weight on squared negative (positive) deviations of output (inflation) and zero weight on squared positive (negative) deviations. Recent approaches to monetary policy under asymmetric preferences have emphasised the adoption of a linear exponential (linex) preference structure. This paper presents a new and different analytic methodology that is based on the explicit calculation of semi-variances. This approach can be used to derive precise coefficients of the optimal interest rate rules. We derive optimal interest rate rules based on two different informational assumptions. In the first case, which we call a fixed interest rate rule, the monetary authority knows only the structure of the economy and the variance of sectoral shocks so that interest rates must take a constant value. In the second case, which we call a flexible interest rate rule, the monetary also has access to additional information in that it can observe the contemporaneous inflation rate. In this second case, we restrict our analysis to the class of linear interest rate rules. The more standard approach in the literature derives optimal monetary policy rules using symmetric loss functions, where monetary policy is designed to minimise the sum of squared components. We also compare optimal interest rate rules under both symmetric and asymmetric loss functions.

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    File URL: http://www.buseco.monash.edu.au/eco/research/papers/2009/2409optimalmonetarystemp.pdf
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    Bibliographic Info

    Paper provided by Monash University, Department of Economics in its series Monash Economics Working Papers with number 33-09.

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    Length: 35 pages
    Date of creation: Aug 2009
    Date of revision:
    Handle: RePEc:mos:moswps:2009-33=

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    Postal: Department of Economics, Monash University, Victoria 3800, Australia
    Phone: +61-3-9905-2493
    Fax: +61-3-9905-5476
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    Web page: http://www.buseco.monash.edu.au/eco/
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    Related research

    Keywords: Monetary Economics; Interest Rate Rule; Inflation Target; Output Target; Asymmetric Loss Function; One-sided Target; Linex Preferences; Semi-Variance; Symmetric Loss Function.;

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    References

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    1. Waud, Roger N, 1976. "Asymmetric Policymaker Utility Functions and Optimal Policy Under Uncertainty," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 44(1), pages 53-66, January.
    2. Virginie Boinet & Christopher Martin, 2008. "Targets, zones, and asymmetries: a flexible nonlinear model of recent UK monetary policy," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 60(3), pages 423-439, July.
    3. Francisco Javier Ruge-Murcia, 2001. "Inflation Targeting Under Asymmetric Preferences," IMF Working Papers 01/161, International Monetary Fund.
    4. Poole, William, 1970. "Optimal Choice of Monetary Policy Instruments in a Simple Stochastic Macro Model," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 84(2), pages 197-216, May.
    5. Cukierman, Alex & Meltzer, Allan H, 1986. "A Theory of Ambiguity, Credibility, and Inflation under Discretion and Asymmetric Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 54(5), pages 1099-1128, September.
    6. Peter Stemp, 1993. "Optimal money supply rules under asymmetric objective criteria," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 57(3), pages 215-232, October.
    7. Peter J. Stemp, 2009. "Optimal Interest Rate Rules Under One-Sided Output and Inflation Targets," Monash Economics Working Papers 32-09, Monash University, Department of Economics.
    8. A. Robert Nobay & David A. Peel, 2003. "Optimal Discretionary Monetary Policy in a Model of Asymmetric Central Bank Preferences," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 113(489), pages 657-665, 07.
    9. Surico, Paolo, 2007. "The Fed's monetary policy rule and U.S. inflation: The case of asymmetric preferences," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 31(1), pages 305-324, January.
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