Shareholder Democracy in Canada
AbstractThe federal government stands poised to exercise its constitutional right to regulate financial markets, an area traditionally left to competing provincial securities commissions. The current state of securities regulation renders impotent US-style takeover defences, such as poison pills and staggered boards, but allows voting caps and pyramiding in their stead. Various federal securities regulation models are weighted in light of the current state of their needed complementary institutions. One option, for which Canada is relatively well prepared, is the British model of activist independent institutional investors and mandatory takeover bids.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc in its series NBER Working Papers with number 16558.
Date of creation: Nov 2010
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Find related papers by JEL classification:
- G23 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Non-bank Financial Institutions; Financial Instruments; Institutional Investors
- G3 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance
- G38 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Government Policy and Regulation
- K22 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Business and Securities Law
- N22 - Economic History - - Financial Markets and Institutions - - - U.S.; Canada: 1913-
- P5 - Economic Systems - - Comparative Economic Systems
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- B. Espen Eckbo, 1986. "Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control: The Canadian Evidence," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 19(2), pages 236-60, May.
- Rocco Huang & Lev Ratnovski, 2009. "Why Are Canadian Banks More Resilient?," IMF Working Papers 09/152, International Monetary Fund.
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