An Empirical Study of the Credit Market with Unobserved Consumer Typers
AbstractThis paper proposes an econometric model to identify unobserved consumer types in the credit market. Consumers choose different amounts of loan because of differences in their time or risk preferences (types). Thus, the unconditional probability of default is modeled using a mixture density combining a type-conditioning default variable with a type-determining random variable. The model is estimated using individual-level consumer credit card information. The parameter estimates and statistical tests support this kind of specification. Furthermore, the model produces better out-of-sample predictions on the probability of default than traditional models; hence, it provides evidence of the existence of types in the consumer credit market.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc in its series NBER Working Papers with number 13873.
Date of creation: Mar 2008
Date of revision:
Contact details of provider:
Postal: National Bureau of Economic Research, 1050 Massachusetts Avenue Cambridge, MA 02138, U.S.A.
Web page: http://www.nber.org
More information through EDIRC
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- C81 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Data Collection and Data Estimation Methodology; Computer Programs - - - Methodology for Collecting, Estimating, and Organizing Microeconomic Data; Data Access
- D12 - Microeconomics - - Household Behavior - - - Consumer Economics: Empirical Analysis
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Milde, Hellmuth & Riley, John G, 1988.
"Signaling in Credit Markets,"
The Quarterly Journal of Economics,
MIT Press, vol. 103(1), pages 101-29, February.
- Christopher R. Knittel & Victor Stango, 2003.
"Price Ceilings as Focal Points for Tacit Collusion: Evidence from Credit Cards,"
American Economic Review,
American Economic Association, vol. 93(5), pages 1703-1729, December.
- Christopher R. Knittel & Victor Stango, 2001. "Price ceilings as focal points for tacit collusion: evidence from credit cards," Working Paper Series WP-01-12, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago.
- Wiginton, John C., 1980. "A Note on the Comparison of Logit and Discriminant Models of Consumer Credit Behavior," Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Cambridge University Press, vol. 15(03), pages 757-770, September.
- D. J. Hand & W. E. Henley, 1997. "Statistical Classification Methods in Consumer Credit Scoring: a Review," Journal of the Royal Statistical Society Series A, Royal Statistical Society, vol. 160(3), pages 523-541.
- Feinstein, Jonathan S, 1990. "Detection Controlled Estimation," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 33(1), pages 233-76, April.
- Edelstein, Robert H, 1975. "Improving the Selection of Credit Risks: An Analysis of a Commercial Bank Minority Lending Program," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 30(1), pages 37-55, March.
- Spence, A Michael, 1973. "Job Market Signaling," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 87(3), pages 355-74, August.
- Stahl, Dale II & Wilson, Paul W., 1994. "Experimental evidence on players' models of other players," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 25(3), pages 309-327, December.
- Jaffee, Dwight M & Russell, Thomas, 1976. "Imperfect Information, Uncertainty, and Credit Rationing," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 90(4), pages 651-66, November.
- Gan, Li & Hernandez, Manuel A. & Liu, Yanyan, 2013.
"Group lending with heterogeneous types:,"
IFPRI discussion papers
1268, International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI).
- Li Gan & Tarun Sabarwal & Shuoxun Zhang, 2010.
"Personal Bankruptcy: Reconciling Adverse Events and Strategic Timing Hypotheses Using Heterogeneity in Filing Types,"
WORKING PAPERS SERIES IN THEORETICAL AND APPLIED ECONOMICS
201008, University of Kansas, Department of Economics, revised May 2011.
- Li Gan & Tarun Sabarwal & Shuoxun Zhang, 2012. "Personal Bankruptcy: Reconciling Adverse Events and Strategic Filing Hypotheses Using Heterogeneity in Filing Types," WORKING PAPERS SERIES IN THEORETICAL AND APPLIED ECONOMICS 201239, University of Kansas, Department of Economics, revised Oct 2012.
- Li Gan & Feng Huang & Adalbert Mayer, 2011. "A Simple Test of Private Information in the Insurance Markets with Heterogeneous Insurance Demand," NBER Working Papers 16738, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: ().
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.