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Individual Versus Aggregate Collateral Constraints and the Overborrowing Syndrome

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  • Martín Uribe

Abstract

This paper compares the equilibrium dynamics of an economy facing an aggregate collateral constraint on external debt to the dynamics of an economy facing a collateral constraint imposed at the level of each individual agent. The aggregate collateral constraint is intended to capture an environment in which foreign investors base their lending decisions predominantly upon macro indicators as opposed to individual abilities to pay. Individual agents do not internalize the aggregate borrowing constraint. Instead, in this economy a country interest-rate premium emerges to clear the financial market. The central finding of the paper is that the economy with the aggregate borrowing limit does not generate higher levels of debt than the economy with the individual borrowing limit. That is, there is no overborrowing in equilibrium.

Suggested Citation

  • Martín Uribe, 2006. "Individual Versus Aggregate Collateral Constraints and the Overborrowing Syndrome," NBER Working Papers 12260, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    • Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:12260
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Schmitt-Grohe, Stephanie & Uribe, Martin, 2003. "Closing small open economy models," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 61(1), pages 163-185, October.
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Uribe, Martín & Schmitt-Grohé, Stephanie, 2012. "Prudential Policy for Peggers," CEPR Discussion Papers 8961, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    2. Michael B. Devereux & James Yetman, 2010. "Leverage Constraints and the International Transmission of Shocks," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 42(s1), pages 71-105, September.
    3. Durdu, Ceyhun Bora & Mendoza, Enrique G. & Terrones, Marco E., 2009. "Precautionary demand for foreign assets in Sudden Stop economies: An assessment of the New Mercantilism," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 89(2), pages 194-209, July.
    4. Fernando Broner & Alberto Martin & Jaume Ventura, 2010. "Sovereign Risk and Secondary Markets," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 100(4), pages 1523-1555, September.
    5. Benigno, Gianluca & Chen, Huigang & Otrok, Christopher & Rebucci, Alessandro & Young, Eric R., 2013. "Financial crises and macro-prudential policies," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 89(2), pages 453-470.
    6. Michael B Devereux & James Yetman, 2010. "Financial deleveraging and the international transmission of shocks," BIS Papers chapters, in: Bank for International Settlements (ed.), The international financial crisis and policy challenges in Asia and the Pacific, volume 52, pages 274-298, Bank for International Settlements.
    7. Gondo, Rocío, 2013. "Default Externalities in Emerging Market Systemic Private Debt Crises," Working Papers 2013-023, Banco Central de Reserva del Perú.
    8. Si Guo & Yun Pei & Zoe Xie, 2018. "Decentralization and Overborrowing in a Fiscal Federation," FRB Atlanta Working Paper 2018-9, Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta.
    9. Andrés Fernández & Alessandro Rebucci & Martín Uribe, 2013. "Are Capital Controls Prudential? An Empirical Investigation," NBER Working Papers 19671, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    10. Fernández Martín, Andrés & Herreño, Juan David, 2013. "Equilibrium Unemployment During Financial Crises," IDB Publications (Working Papers) 4238, Inter-American Development Bank.
    11. Si Guo & Yun Pei & Zoe Xie, 2018. "Fiscal Decentralization, Intergovernmental Transfer, and Overborrowing," 2018 Meeting Papers 975, Society for Economic Dynamics.
    12. Gondo, Rocío, 2014. "State Contingent Assets, Financial Crises and Pecuniary Externalities in Models with Collateral Constraints," Working Papers 2014-001, Banco Central de Reserva del Perú.

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    JEL classification:

    • F41 - International Economics - - Macroeconomic Aspects of International Trade and Finance - - - Open Economy Macroeconomics

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