Firms' Demand for Employment-Based Mental Health Benefits
AbstractEmployment-based health insurance is the main source of health coverage for the non-elderly. Few previous studies have examined the factors that impact employer decision-making in selecting the coverage to offer to their employees and none have examined generosity of mental health coverage. This paper uses cross-sectional data from a survey of medium to large firms, including information on employee characteristics, to examine the empirical determinants of mental health coverage choices. We find that the firm's demand for mental health coverage is strongly influenced by employee characteristics. We also find that certain state and local policy interventions directed at enhancing access to mental health care have impacts on coverage decisions. Specifically, public provision of mental health lowers mental health coverage generosity and parity legislation increases mental health generosity. Future research with panel data is warranted to examine the causal effects of these policies.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc in its series NBER Working Papers with number 11436.
Date of creation: Jun 2005
Date of revision:
Contact details of provider:
Postal: National Bureau of Economic Research, 1050 Massachusetts Avenue Cambridge, MA 02138, U.S.A.
Web page: http://www.nber.org
More information through EDIRC
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- I1 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Rea, Samuel A, Jr, 1981. "Workmen's Compensation and Occupational Safety under Imperfect Information," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 71(1), pages 80-93, March.
- Long, James E & Scott, Frank A, 1982. "The Income Tax and Nonwage Compensation," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 64(2), pages 211-19, May.
- Jensen, Gail A & Gabel, Jon R, 1992. "State Mandated Benefits and the Small Firm's Decision to Offer Insurance," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 4(4), pages 379-404, December.
- Kate Bundorf, M., 2002. "Employee demand for health insurance and employer health plan choices," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 21(1), pages 65-88, January.
- Morris M. Kleiner & Richard B. Freeman, 2000. "Who Benefits Most from Employee Involvement: Firms or Workers?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 90(2), pages 219-223, May.
- Gruber, Jonathan & Lettau, Michael, 2004. "How elastic is the firm's demand for health insurance?," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 88(7-8), pages 1273-1293, July.
- Jonathan Gruber & Michael Lettau, 2000. "How Elastic is the Firm's Demand for Health Insurance?," NBER Working Papers 8021, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Rask, Kevin N. & Rask, Kimberly J., 2000. "Public insurance substituting for private insurance: new evidence regarding public hospitals, uncompensated care funds, and medicaid," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 19(1), pages 1-31, January.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: ().
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.