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How Large are the Classification Errors in the Social Security Disability Award Process?

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Author Info
Hugo Benitez-Silva
Moshe Buchinsky
John Rust

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Abstract

This paper presents an audit' of the multistage application and appeal process that the U.S. Social Security Administration (SSA) uses to determine eligibility for disability benefits from the Disability Insurance (DI) and Supplemental Security Income (SSI) programs. We study a subset of individuals from the Health and Retirement Study (HRS) who applied for DI or SSI benefits between 1992 and 1996. We compare the SSA's ultimate award decision (i.e. after allowing for appeals) to the applicant's self-reported disability status. We use these data to estimate classification error rates under the hypothesis that applicants' self-reported disability status and the SSA's ultimate award decision are noisy but unbiased indicators of, a latent true disability status' indicator. We find that approximately 20% of SSI/DI applicants who are ultimately awarded benefits are not disabled, and that 60% of applicants who were denied benefits are disabled. Our analysis also yields insights into the patterns of self-selection induced by varying delays and award probabilities at various levels of the application and appeal process. We construct an optimal statistical screening rule using a subset of objective health indicators that the SSA uses in making award decisions that results in significantly lower classification error rates than does SSA's current award process.

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Paper provided by National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc in its series NBER Working Papers with number 10219.

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Date of creation: Jan 2004
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Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:10219

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H3 - Public Economics - - Fiscal Policies and Behavior of Economic Agents

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References listed on IDEAS
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  1. John Rust & Christopher Phelan, 1997. "How Social Security and Medicare Affect Retirement Behavior in a World of Incomplete Markets," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 65(4), pages 781-832, July.
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  2. Diamond, P. A. & Mirrlees, J. A., 1978. "A model of social insurance with variable retirement," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 10(3), pages 295-336, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  3. Bound, John & Waidmann, Timothy, 1992. "Disability Transfers, Self-Reported Health, and the Labor Force Attachment of Older Men: Evidence from the Historical Record," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 107(4), pages 1393-419, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Parsons, Donald O., 1996. "Imperfect 'tagging' in social insurance programs," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 62(1-2), pages 183-207, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  1. Laurence, JACQUET, 2006. "Optimal disability assistance when fraud and stigma matter," Université catholique de Louvain, Département des Sciences Economiques Working Paper 2006052, Université catholique de Louvain, Département des Sciences Economiques. [Downloadable!]
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  2. Rehn, Eric, 2007. "Imperfect Tagging Revisited," Working Papers 2007:2, Lund University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  3. Sergi Jiménez-Martín & José M. Labeaga & Cristina Vilaplana, 2006. "Award Errors and Permanent Disability Benefits in Spain," Working Papers 2006-18, FEDEA. [Downloadable!]
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  4. Louis Kaplow, 2006. "Optimal Income Transfers," NBER Working Papers 12284, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  5. Mikhail Golosov & Aleh Tsyvinski, 2004. "Designing Optimal Disability Insurance: A Case for Asset Testing," NBER Working Papers 10792, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  6. Johansson, Per & Skedinger, Per, 2005. "Are Objective, Official Measures of Disability Reliable?," Working Paper Series 643, Research Institute of Industrial Economics. [Downloadable!]
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  7. Radha Iyengar & Giovanni Mastrobuoni, 2008. "The Political Economy of the Disability Insurance. Theory and Evidence of Gubernatorial Learning from Social Security Administration Monitoring," Carlo Alberto Notebooks 70, Collegio Carlo Alberto. [Downloadable!]
  8. John Bound & Todd Stinebrickner & Timothy Waidman, 2004. "Using a Structural Retirement Model to Simulate the Effect of Changes to the OASDI and Medicare Programs," Working Papers wp091, University of Michigan, Michigan Retirement Research Center. [Downloadable!]
  9. Michel, DE VROEY, 2006. "Getting Rid of Keynes ? A reflection on the history of macroeconomics," Université catholique de Louvain, Département des Sciences Economiques Working Paper 2006051, Université catholique de Louvain, Département des Sciences Economiques. [Downloadable!]
  10. David Autor & Mark Duggan, 2006. "The Growth in the Social Security Disability Rolls: A Fiscal Crisis Unfolding," NBER Working Papers 12436, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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